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ABSTRACT 
The NATO–Russian relations remain to be one of the major strands of global security in 
the twenty-first century. Given the more complex threats to global security today, the 
rising energy demand and dependency of Europe, and increasing foreign trade between 
the parties, Russia’s relations with the West, as a major fossil-fuel exporter and nuclear 
country, have become increasingly important. The new security environment of post-–
September 11 has prepared a common ground for a closer partnership between old 
enemies. However, the attempts from both sides have been unable to move beyond a 
certain level of cooperation. This thesis presents an analysis as to the likelihood of a true 
NATO–Russia strategic partnership by exploring the perspectives of Russia and NATO, 
long standing obstacles and differences, and opportunities in the twenty-first century. It 
seeks to answer the broad question of whether it is possible for Russia and NATO to 
make a clean sweep of lingering legacies of deep-seated antagonism and distrust, move 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Many critics of NATO alert to its relations to Russia often doubt it efficacy as a 
security organization, while ignoring its remarkable transformation since 1989. “With the 
end of the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has continued to 
struggle to define its identity and clarify its raison d’etre.”1 Russia, in the meanwhile, has 
sought to overcome its economic and political imbalances and promote its assertiveness 
in both its traditional sphere of influence and the international stage. Relations between 
the two entities oscillated between excessive optimism and over-pessimism on the 
common denominator of distrust. This study aims to answer the question of whether a 
common ground of international relations and security could be constructed between 
NATO and Russia by analyzing all impeding factors, shared interests, and common 
challenges that could serve as an inhibitor or catalyst in promoting a strategic partnership. 
The thesis aims also to understand NATO and Russian security perceptions and 
foreign and security policies towards each other and to scrutinize the prospects of 
achieving a healthy partnership in the areas of security and defense. In this connection, 
the analysis treats the following questions: How relations between Russia and NATO 
evolved at the turn of the 21st century, and whether constructive initiatives of NATO, 
under its cooperative security approach, would help overcome difficulties and obstacles 
in normalizing relations and promoting a strategic partnership between the two former 
enemies. Ultimately, the thesis seeks to answer the broad question of whether it is 
possible for Russia and NATO to make a clean sweep of lingering legacies of deep-
seated antagonism and distrust, move beyond cultural, religious, and historical 
differences, and lay the foundations of a healthy lasting partnership. 
                                                




B. IMPORTANCE  
NATO–Russian relations constitute one of the major components of the 21st 
century’s new security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic region, especially for those who 
regard the fate of Europe and its adjoining areas key to world peace. The new security 
environment of post-September 11 has prepared a common ground for a closer 
partnership between old enemies. However, the attempts from both sides have been 
unable to move beyond a certain level of cooperation. This thesis will seek to illuminate 
the importance and possibility of the NATO–Russia strategic partnership under the 21st 
century’s new security considerations by analyzing the common interests, concerns, and 
expectations of the parties and the origins of the friction in the light of key events and 
developments in the last two decades.  
Since the end of Cold War, NATO has sought to justify its existence and make its 
raison d’etre clear. It pursued an eastward enlargement, integrating most of the former 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and sought to create a stable space 
suitable for democracy, rule of law, human rights, and market economy to flourish, while 
trying to avoid any confrontation with Russia. Russia usually considered NATO’s 
enlargement as a threat to its national security and interests. The relations of NATO and 
Russia have progressed on a rocky path during the two decades following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, oscillating between the promise of stronger partnership in an era of 
unpredictable, asymmetric, transnational threats to global security, and lingering 
memories of old antagonism and distrust.  
“Russia [always] remained a major factor in Allied calculations.”2 Despite its 
collapsed economy and heavily weakened military, Russia has maintained its potential 
for enhancing its economic growth and revitalizing its strategic significance as a nuclear 
power and a natural-resource-rich country.3 NATO and the United States still possess 
                                                
2 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama, 
New York, NY: Continuum, 2010, 130. 
3 Ibid., 130. 
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ninety percent of world’s nuclear arsenal.4 Furthermore, Lionel Ponsard asserts that 
“NATO’s future not only depended on its ability to adapt to new international 
environment, but it was closely related to the turn of its future relations with Russian 
Federation.”5 Aware of this reality, NATO pursued a constructive attitude towards Russia 
and sought to avoid any serious confrontation.  
This research is pertinent due to the vital role of Russian–NATO relations for the 
future of both the West and Russia. Given the more complex threats to global security 
today, the rising energy demand and dependency of Europe, and increasing foreign trade 
between the parties, Russia’s relations with the West, as a major fossil-fuel exporter and 
nuclear country, have become increasingly important.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines whether two former enemies of the cold war, NATO and 
Russia, could further their cooperation to the level of a true strategic partnership in the 
21st century. It analyzes the factors increasing or decreasing this possibility, the evolution 
of the NATO–Russia relationship in the last two decades, and how the cooperative-
security concept has worked in this process. Lionel Ponsard argues, “There is still a long 
way to go before these relations will be fully normalized. However, this past decade of 
oscillating relations is very instructive in many respects.”6  
Many scholars object to the idea of integration of Russia into the alliance and 
West on the grounds that it has a distinct identity and belongs to Asia, and may cause the 
alliance to collapse from within; while some assert that Russia’s progress towards 
democracy and Western values since Peter the Great was interrupted by the Bolshevik 
Revolution and that the collapse of Soviet Union has enabled parties to resume, and even 
hasten, this progress. This thesis seeks to illuminate commonalities and differences 
between Russia and West in terms of values, norms, and institutions. It tries to answer 
                                                
4 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen speech at the University of Chicago’s Harris 
School, 12 May 2012, http://www.natochannel.tv/?uri=channels/381662/1332785 
5 Lionel Ponsard, Russia, NATO and cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap, London and New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2007, 1. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
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whether and how they can leave the unpleasant legacies of fifty years behind and move 
forward to a smoother course of relations. The Russian identity and political culture will 
be analyzed and the impact of Putin’s administration will be analyzed. 
The new threat perceptions and security system introduced by the terrorist attacks 
in September 11, 2001 have necessitated closer cooperation and partnership globally. 
“The new threats to world security are defined as unpredictable, transnational, 
asymmetric, and nonconventional.”7  In this new context, this study seeks to illuminate 
the common challenges and interests of the two former enemies that bring them together 
in an era of uncertainty. It discusses the perspectives of Brussels and Moscow by 
analyzing their expectations and concerns under the light of important events and 
developments in the past two decades. 
Overall, this thesis examines the hypothesis that, despite many risks and 
obstacles, improvement of relations and achievement of a stronger cooperation and 
strategic partnership is still possible and important in the NATO–Russia relations, and 
requires only positive approaches from the two entities. There are many opportunities for 
rebuilding trust and strengthening relations, as well as many impediments. The parties 
need to concentrate on opportunities and commonalities rather than over-focusing on 
obstacles and differences, if they are to promote peace and stability in Europe. NATO 
needs to acknowledge that Russia evolves differently and should remain patient as 
Russian journeys to democracy and predictability. It also has to be ready to recognize a 
greater say for Russia in its designs for frictionless, sustainable relations and a stable and 
peace-promoting Europe. Russia, on the other hand, should put aside old hatreds, limit its 
ambitions, and grasp how costly it could be for it to deepen the cleavages. Lionel Ponsard 
argues that “by building confidence between the two parties about each other’s 
intentions, cooperative security can regulate attitudes that might otherwise lead to 
misperception.”8 In this sense, the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) can serve as a dialogue 
medium, which is crucial for elimination of biases, concern, and misperceptions.  
                                                
7 Ibid., 2. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In conducting research for this thesis, sources of various types were consulted. 
These include works examining perspectives on Russia and NATO and Russia’s political 
institutions, culture, foreign policy, and compatibility with Western values. The works 
below were drawn upon frequently and helped support to arguments of the thesis. 
Aurel Braun’s editorial work NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century 
is a collection of articles regarding the NATO–Russia relations. This study examines first 
the internal and external dynamics that influence these relations. It provides a theoretical 
framework for Russia’s transition to democracy, which is seen by many as the biggest 
hampering factor in the NATO–Russia relations, and analyzes the impact of NATO’s 
policies on relations, providing both optimistic and pessimistic views, according to the 
various scholars. Aurel Braun asserts, “As the Alliance also sought simultaneously to 
enhance its cooperation with Russia, the latter has become more assertive just as its 
transition to democracy has become more uncertain. Yet all parties have a powerful 
interest in building and maintaining security.”9 He concludes that both sides need a 
realistic perspective that is aware of both opportunities and obstacles in the 21st century. 
And he highlights that “there is consensus among the contributors that, although there are 
opportunities for building trust and strengthening democracies in a new NATO–Russia 
relationship in this century, there are also many risks and grave dangers.”10 
Lionel Ponsard’s book Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security explores the 
common ground between NATO and Russia and the potential to move beyond cultural 
differences, particularly in political culture.11  It aims to find out if cooperative security 
could be helpful in this regard and concludes affirmatively. He asserts “the closer the 
interaction between NATO and Russia, the more they will find ways to further their 
security and understanding one another.”12 He believes history is very helpful for 
extracting lessons that can be applied to further interactions, and if NATO and Russia 
                                                
9 Braun, NATO–Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 1. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 Ponsard, Bridging the Gap, Introduction, 1. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
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make a clean sweep of mutual distrust and draw appropriate lessons from the past, it is 
highly possible for them to construct a true strategic partnership in the future. 
Stanley R. Sloan asserts in his work ‘Permanent Alliance?’ that in the post–Cold 
War global order, NATO’s primary concern has moved beyond Russia. However, it has 
remained a major factor, as it still is a  nuclear power and and has the potential of making 
a big economic leap with its natural-resource-rich territory, even if its economy and 
military collapsed.13 He emphasizes the clash of domination over Central and Eastern 
Europe over the former CIS countries. He asserts that the Russian domestic political 
atmosphere is the most important variable of mutual relations. The anti-democratic and 
authoritarian tendencies of Russian political leadership have negative consequences for 
relations. He asserts that  
 . . . NATO faces a true dilemma: cooperation with Russia is a key element 
of future European and international peace; but NATO’s integrity requires 
that the values for which the alliance stands—democracy, individual 
liberty, and the rule of law—and the interests of the allies in defending 
their security remain at the heart of the alliance’s purpose.”14 Therefore, 
NATO countries design their policies around constructive involvement of 
Russia in European and global security affairs, aware of “ . . . European 
security cannot be confidently secured without Moscow’s constructive 
participation.15  
The work of Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertyl Nygren, Russia and Europe: Building 
Bridges, Digging Trenches, collects many related articles under three main topics. Their 
study aims to shed light on the relations of Russia with the West and the possibility of its 
integration into Europe. The first part examines Russian norms, values, and institutions, 
in addition to the Russian way of democracy. The question of where Russia belongs is 
examined in this chapter.  
Trofimenko concludes that “there is an ‘emerging consensus’ that Russia ‘has to 
follow its own unique ways and traditions because Russia is neither a purely Western nor 
purely Eastern nation, but blends in its nature a combination of both cultures, psches, and 
                                                
13 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 130. 
14 Ibid.,143. 
15 Ibid., 144. 
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even genes.”16 Ideational and cultural differences,  Nygren asserts, constitute the main 
factors in the friction between the West and Russia. The second part analyzes Moscow’s 
relations with Brussels and three  European great powers, focusing on hard security and 
economic dimensions. They argue that the worldwide economic recession has 
undermined Russia’s authoritarian political leadership’s authority and legitimacy, which 
was strenghtened by the economic growth achieved during the first decade of the 21st 
century. This may render amelioration of relations possible on the grounds that, as he 
believes, the Putin administration is one of the major impediments to relations. On the 
other hand, he asserts that “NATO will be considered a threat unless, it is granted a 
genuine say in the organization (or even membership) and NATO seriously downplays its 
article five orientation.”17 In the third part of his work, Trofimenko examines the 
influence of the conflict of West and Russia over the former Soviet republics and former 
communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe.  
Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring’s book, After Putin’s Russia, examines 
the Putin administration’s impact on domestic political culture, economy, society, 
military, and foreign policy in Russia. It is helpful in understanding the internal political 
dynamics of Russia and its reflections in foreign policy. It also shed light on the present 
situation in Russia in terms of democracy, freedoms, and individual liberties.  
Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov’s book Between Democracy 
and Dictatorship, a collection of articles regarding the Russian political system in the 
post–Cold War era, seeks to answer the question of how democracy evolved after the fall 
of communism in Russia and what factors contributed to this process. They basically 
argue that Russia is not a full democracy, but not a dictatorship either. Beyond simplistic 
and optimistic approaches, their study provides a deep and realistic view of the current 
situation in Russian political life.  
                                                
16 Tormifenko, Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia,187–88 in Kjell Engelbrekt, 
and Bertil Nygren:  Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches, New York, NY: Routledge, 
2010, 4. 
17 Kjell Engelbrekt, and Bertil Nygren:  Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches, New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2010, 8. 
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David Yost examines the evolution of NATO’s assumed roles during the Cold 
War and its aftermath in his work NATO Transformed. He assesses the alliance’s post–
Cold War policies and institutions and asserts that “NATO’s self-assigned new role as an 
‘agent of change’ throughout Europe has raised great challenges, as well as questions 
about the future purposes and nature of the alliance.”18 Due to the open-ended 
enlargement process, NATO has had to face many challenges that could threaten the 
peace and stability of Europe. Russia has claimed that enlargement of NATO undermines 
its security and objected to NATO’s attempts to enlarge the process. Yost claims, in this 
regard, that “no issue is more central to the Alliance’s goal of a building a peaceful 
political order in Europe than relations with Russia,”19 and examines NATO–Russian 
relations beginning from NACC to Founding Act and PJC. 
Jeffrey Mankoff”s work Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power 
Politics explores the components of Russian foreign policy and the factors that shape it. 
He basically argues that Russia is neither anti- nor pro-Western, but rather, pragmatic.   
He analyzes the ideological and political currents in Russia that are reconciled in the style 
of Vladimir Putin. He also examines the relations between the West and Russia and 
explores the prospects of confrontation and integration. He draws particular attention to 
the geopolitical dynamism around Russia by pointing China’s rise. And he finally 
analyzes the course of Russian foreign policy’s outlook since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. 
Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee attempt in their book The Foreign 
Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests to present a description and an 
explanation of Russian foreign policy. They frame their study in a historical context by 
covering the late Soviet era and the 20th century, and explore the tsarist and Soviet 
legacies in the current foreign policy of Moscow. While exploring internal and external 
factors, they bring continuities and changes in dynamic to the attention of the reader. 
                                                
18 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, 91. 
19 Ibid., 131. 
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They basically argue that Russian foreign policy has not been different from that of other 
great powers, even though it has had some unique aspects. 
Ian Q.R. Thomas’ work The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political 
Imagination explores conceptions of NATO’s form and function and the changes in 
NATO’s goals and objectives since its creation in 1949 and throughout the Cold War and 
aftermath. Thomas argues that those who believe that NATO sooner or later will be 
defunct with the end of the Cold War are mistaken, since NATO’s record is remarkable 
in perpetuating itself through new rhetoric and conception that reflect initiatives of 
collective defense and cooperative security of notable merit, despite all detractors 
assertions to the contrary. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is based on a qualitative historical study and analysis that includes the 
critical analyses of variables affecting the NATO–Russia relations. First, It will examine 
the historical, structural, and political components of these variables through an analytical 
method. It will also include a comparative assessment of Russian and NATO perspectives 
and their impact on contemporary and future relations. The evolution of the NATO–
Russia relations will be put in historical perspective, and continuities and discontinuities 
in relations will be explored. In the final part of the thesis, the relations between two 
entities will be assessed in the context of the cooperative-security concept. How a 
constructivist approach is helpful for the wellbeing of relations, as compared with a 
realist approach, will be explained by a comparative method.  
This thesis relies on both primary and secondary resources. NATO’s 1991, 1999, 
and 2010 strategic concepts and Russia’s new strategic concept and military doctrine 
(2010) will be evaluated within the context of the NATO–Russia relations. The North 
Atlantic Treaty, Founding Act (1997), and remarks and statements of leaders, summit 
communiqués of NATO, NATO–Russia Council meeting declarations, official 
documents, press conferences and releases will be used as primary sources, in addition to 
the sources in the literature review.  
 10 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II explores why partnership is 
necessary and important. The post–September 11 security environment and common 
interests of Russia and NATO are analyzed in this chapter. A comparison of Russian and 
NATO perspectives is also presented. 
Chapter III examines the sources of friction between Russia and NATO. It aims to 
unveil the political, cultural, and geographical factors that distance Russia from West. 
Chapter IV analyzes Russian foreign policy in the 21st century and attempts to 
explain to what extent Vladimir Putin has been influential. 
Chapter V analyzes the importance of the cooperative-security concept and 
constructive efforts of parties in the post–Cold War era. How much these initiatives, from 









II. WHY DOES STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NATO 
AND RUSSIA MATTER? 
This chapter analyzes the transformation in the security environment in the 21st 
century and the needs and roles of international political actors in an era of rapid change. 
Next, it presents the need for cooperation and partnership between NATO and Russia, by 
analyzing shared interests and common challenges; finally, the perspectives of involved 
parties and their concerns, expectations, and latest strategy documents are assessed. 
A. CONVERGING INTERESTS AND DIVERSIFYING CHALLENGES IN A 
NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the security 
environment and threats to the security of countries, alliances, and the entire world have 
changed dramatically. Technological and geopolitical changes have revolutionized threat 
perceptions and means of assuring security. The relatively stagnant and predictable nature 
of the Cold War has been replaced by unprecedented uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Regional ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Central 
Asia, Africa, and South Asia, and the emergence of transnational terrorist organizations, 
religious radicalization, shifts in global economic balances, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear weapons, and rising demand for energy and 
water supplies pose great risks to global security and peace by the atmosphere of 
uncertainty and unpredictability they have created. Among the increasing imbalances, 
states seek security either by increasing their defense spending, and accordingly their 
military power, or making alliances through which to pool their capabilities. 
The changing balance in today’s geopolitical setting from unipolarity to 
multipolarity is one of the major concerns of the era. The demographic and economic rise 
of the East and South Asia and the awakening of the Muslim world complicate the 
strategic calculations of the older great powers. Two main actors of the Cold War era, 
Russia—the heir of the Soviet Union—and the U.S. and its NATO allies have devoted 
significant attention and effort to reading this change and lessening uncertainty. As a 
component of global security, Euro-Atlantic security, in which Russia and NATO are the 
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major actors, suffers the same problems and is threatened by similar realities. The peace 
and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, which has been threatened by numerous ethnic and 
religious conflicts, mushrooming radical Islamic groups and terrorist organizations, 
cyber-terrorism, energy insecurity, the increasing illegal drug trade, and organized crime, 
necessitates cooperation and common efforts among all countries, particularly Russia and 
NATO. However, Russia and NATO have failed to carry their relationship to a strategic 
level, despite the road they have covered. The former UK ambassador to Russia, Andrew 
Wood, notes that if Euro-Atlantic actors and Russia are to address the challenges and 
threats of the 21st century, they have to set the NATO–Russia relationship on a 
unambiguous course. 20 Considering how far Russia and NATO have come in their 
relations since the height of the Cold War, a sound relationship is not a wishful thinking, 
but rather an achievable goal.  
A quick glance at the key events in the first decade of the 21st century reveals the 
enormous changes that have occurred in the security environment and threat perceptions 
and security policies of Russia and NATO countries: 
• The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, followed by NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq  
• The attacks by Islamic terrorists in Madrid and London metros in 2004 
and 2005 
• NATO enlargements in 1999, 2004 and 2009  
• The cyber attack on Estonian servers in 2007 that crashed the country’s 
public-communications infrastructure  
• The enormous increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden,  one of the most 
important maritime trade routes in the  world. 
• The resurgence of the political goal of a nuclear-free world, suggested by 
U.S President Barack Obama in Prague in 2009. 
• Reform of the European Union (EU) through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
which anchored a solidarity and mutual assistance clause in the and 
thereby laid the foundations for a European Defense Union 
• The Arab Spring in Tunisia and Algeria in December 2010 
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• NATO’s intervention in Libya in March 2011 followed by the overthrow 
and death of Muammar Gaddafi. 
• Ongoing conflicts in Syria since March 2011. 21 
This short list of events that occurred in the past decade reveals the complexity of 
the security environment and the necessity of dialogue, cooperation, and partnership 
among countries and organizations, particularly NATO and Russia.  
In the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO, proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
WMDs and international terrorism are perceived as major threats, along with more 
conventional threats. They cause significant concern in the alliance because of the danger 
they pose to global stability and prosperity. Among new phenomena in the 21st century, 
terrorism is perceived as a direct threat to the NATO countries and global security. The 
increasing probability of terrorist group’s acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical, 
and radiological weapons aggravates the problem. In addition to those three main threats, 
cyber attacks, piracy, overdependence on energy imports, environmental problems, and 
resource constrains, including climate change, water scarcity, and health risks, pose 
increasing threats and risks to global security and NATO’s interests.22   
2010 Strategic Concept also draws attention to the importance of developing 
relations between NATO and Russia, which is essential for the creation of a common 
space of peace, stability, and security. It also suggests a need for the improvement of 
partnership to a true strategic level. Despite differences on particular issues, it 
acknowledges that the security of NATO and Russia are intertwined. 23 To this end, “At 
Lisbon, the 29 the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) leaders . . . endorsed [also] a joint 
review of 21st century common security challenges, which include Afghanistan, 
terrorism, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery, and natural and man-made disasters.”24 Andrew Monaghan, a research advisor 
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22 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 20 November 2010, par. 7–15. 
23 Ibid., par. 33. 
24 “NATO’s relations with Russia,” NATO Official Webpage, 
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at the NATO Defense College, suggests, “In effect, this review has a dual purpose. First, 
it underscores the attempt to change perceptions—stating that NATO and Russia share 
common interests and face common challenges. Second, it hones the NATO–Russia 
agenda by identifying a range of cooperation projects.”25  
Most recently, at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the importance of the 
NATO–Russia cooperation in the face of the challenges and threats of the 21st century 
was underlined as follows: 
NATO–Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to 
creating a common space of peace, stability and security. We remain 
determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in 
the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments 
of the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We want 
to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will 
act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.26 
In the Chicago Summit declaration, the importance of the role of the NRC as a 
forum for transparent political dialogue was emphasized. Particularly, at a practical level, 
cooperation in Afghanistan with regard to transit arrangements, training of narcotics 
personnel, helicopter maintenance, and counterterrorism cooperation and exercise was 
indicated as the sign of a common determination to build peace and stability in the 
region.  
From the standpoint of Moscow, the preservation of stability and peace in Europe 
is as important as a goal of policy. Russia’s economic and social recovery requires 
preservation of the international status quo. Furthermore, geopolitical dynamism around 
Russia itself compels Russia to have a stable Western border, that is to say, good 
relations and cooperation. The threats perceived by NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept are 
entirely relevant to Moscow. Moscow’s dealing with them individually is unthinkable, 
considering the complexity and, particularly, transnational character of some of them.  
                                                
25 Andrew Monaghan, “From Lisbon to Munich: Russian Views of NATO–Russia Relations,” 
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http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=3   
26 North Atlantic Council, Chicago Summit Declaration, 20 May 2012, Par. 36.  
 15 
B. THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE  
“Geopolitics argues that it is geography which defines power, and that military 
and economic and political power are different parts of a single system.”27 We need to 
look briefly at Russia’s geopolitical conditions to be able to make an assessment 
regarding its perspective on NATO. Russia has been experiencing structural economic 
problems, a demographic decline, and a military undergoing a transformation while 
having to deal with insurgency in the northern Caucasus. The global economic crisis 
slows down Moscow and reduces policy effectiveness in addressing those issues. 
Therefore, “Foreign policy under both Putin and Medvedev has been aimed at creating a 
favorable environment for economic and sociopolitical modernization, while ensuring 
that Russia is not weakened on the international scene.”28 Still, because of its vast 
geographical size, abundance of natural resources, and nuclear capabilities, Russia 
continues to be a power, despite enduring demographic, military, and economic 
problems. However, all things considered, including emerging dynamic geopolitical 
actors around its borders, these challenges compel Russia into closer partnership with 
NATO. 
The challenges Russia is facing in the 21st century are listed and described in 
such security and strategy documents as Foreign Policy Concept, National Strategy 
Document and Military Doctrine (MD). The concern over NATO’s enlargement of its 
borders and influence into close proximity with Russia’s borders, and installments of 
missile defense units in Central and Eastern Europe, are common themes in these 
documents. Particularly, MD still refers to NATO as a “military danger,” if not anymore 
a “threat.” On the other hand, these documents without exception stress on the need for 
closer relations, cooperation, and partnership with NATO. This ambivalence actually can 
be read as the desire of Russia for partnership and cooperation, despite its lack of trust. 
                                                
27 George Friedman, “The World in the Next 100 Years,” 27 August 2009, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/north-america/2009/08/power-china-world-japan-poland, accessed on 6 
November 2012. 
28 Isabelle François, “The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security: How to Address the Unfinished 
Business of the Post–Cold War Era” Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, NATO Defense University, April 2012 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/CTSS%20Transatlantic%20Perspectives%202.pdf 
 16 
The resolved and unresolved conflicts within and around the borders of Russia 
have substantial impact in its strategic thinking. Russia has the biggest territorial space 
and longest land borders in the world. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, many 
border disputes with China and Japan remain unresolved. There are troubled areas as 
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechenistan that bear a 
high potential of reappearing conflict. Particularly, the conflict over Russian forces in 
Chechnya troubled much of the post-Soviet era. Including that in the arctic, current and 
potential territorial claims and the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space have great 
effect on Russian strategic thinking. 29 
Another major issue affecting traditional Russian thinking is the geopolitical 
dynamism and ongoing change in the security environment around Russia. The growing 
influence of NATO and the EU in the West, emerging economic and political influence 
of China in the Southeast, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the South have 
forced Russia to reconsider its geopolitical priorities and national strategies. Furthermore, 
Moscow’s loss of strategic ground and influence in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, 
and Central and Eastern Europe have aggravated its strategic position and made its deep-
seated insecurity even worse. Russian leaders has remained skeptical, particularly, in 
relations with Western countries and security organizations, which they blame for taking 
advantage of Russia’s temporary weakness in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.30 
Vis-à-vis China, a growing concern of Russian policymakers cannot be 
overlooked, despite seemingly good relations and close cooperation and partnership 
between Moscow and Beijing. Russia considers its partnership and cooperation with 
China as a big gain; however, it remains ambivalent about the future of the relationship 
and does not want to become a junior partner of its rising neighbor.31  
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Principally, Moscow sees the United States and NATO as strategic competitors 
and is concerned about their military and political presence near Russian borders. 
Moscow does not want to engage in a submissive relationship with them either. Moscow 
seeks equality in its relationships with all other political entities, whether it is NATO and 
the U.S. or China. As Dmitri Trenin, the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center 
and chair of its foreign and security policy program, notes, “Rather than being 
sandwiched between two superpowers, Russia hopes to be a major independent actor and 
maybe even an arbiter between the two.”32   
All these territorial disputes, conflicts, and the geopolitical dynamism around 
Russia’s periphery have reinforced Moscow’s deep-seated sense of insecurity and shaped 
its strategic priorities in the 21st century. In the middle of such geopolitical dynamism 
and potential conflicts, Russia has tried to bolster its strategic deterrence and military 
capabilities. It has been modernizing its military and investing in space and satellite 
systems and nuclear and cyber technology for a decade. All things considered, given the 
growing instability and dynamic threats around its borders and potential conflicts in 
former Soviet space, it is best for Russia’s interest to have a peaceful and stable European 
space to its west. Russia has no other option but to repair and consolidate its relations 
with the West. Nobody can argue that a Russian–U.S. or NATO alliance against China in 
the future is impossible or irrelevant. 
Even though Russian strategic policymakers value Machtpolitik and prioritize 
power, notably military power, over every other foreign-policy tool, their awareness 
regarding the economic and cultural means for exerting political influence is increasing. 
In this sense, they are in favor of maintaining and improving stability in Europe. Hence, 
Moscow, principally, is happy with the overall course of the relations with the EU and 
NATO that has allowed Russia increasing, if not completely, equal say since the 
establishment of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991.  
 
 




Russian policies, therefore, are not anti-American or anti-anything, Moscow is open to 
any relationship, cooperation or partnership that fits within its interests and is based on 
the principle of equality.  
It is true that there are some milieus in Moscow that see NATO particularly as a 
threat, blaming it for being an imperialist political and military instrument of the U.S. and 
causing the difficulties Russia has been experiencing in the Northern Caucasus and other 
former Soviet areas.33 Those cadres, most of which are conservative and nationalist 
forces that dominate the defense and security institutions, claim that NATO’s real target 
is still Russia and the rhetoric regarding terrorism, sea piracy, narcotics, or cyber attacks 
is a sham.34 Michael Bohm, the opinion editor of the Moscow Times, claims, “This fear 
was reflected in Russia’s latest military strategy, published in February [2012], in which 
NATO was listed as the country’s No.1 danger.” To them, called by some Slavophiles, 
Russian membership is not a good idea for two reasons: first, it brings Russia to a status 
of another large European Country that would mean giving up its sovereignty and 
independence, and particularly its global great-power dreams; and second, Russia would 
become subordinate to the U.S. within this organization.35 Even though the Putin 
administration is not anti-Western, its concerns regarding sovereignty and independence 
in foreign policy and the economy, and conditions and reservations regarding equality in 
relationships, are reflections of the views of this influential group within the security and 
defense organizations.  
Lately, after the Obama’s “reset” initiative, Russia-NATO relationship entered a 
new phase despite the persistence of distrust between parties. “Russia’s ambassador to 
NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, echoed such views, observing that the relationship had 
improved and entered a qualitatively new level.”36 It is important to state that 
Medvedev’s acknowledgement of the necessity of participation by all parties in a sound 
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and healthy Euro-Atlantic security is determinative. As Medvedev, then president said, 
security is indivisible, referring to the concept of “indivisibility of security,” and 
everybody has its part to play in protecting it. No country can achieve it alone.37 
With regard to the ‘indivisibility of security’, Sergei Lavrov, currently Foreign 
Minister of Russia, claims, “This principle [indivisibility of security] was proclaimed by 
OSCE, NATO and the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) alike. But whereas the North 
Atlantic Alliance made indivisible security a legally binding norm, the OSCE and the 
NRC have not gone beyond mere political declarations, lacking any legal or practical 
content.”38 He goes on to say, “We would like the NRC proclaimed principles of 
indivisibility of security in Europe to be translated into practice.”39 
Two things are obvious in both of these speeches and the NATO-Russia relations 
on the whole: first the lack of mutual trust—Moscow is skeptical about the words and 
deeds of NATO; second, Russia’s desire to cooperate, integrate; or being treated on equal 
terms. Moscow still views itself on the periphery of NATO’s decision-making and 
planning due, to three reasons that reinforces its distrust against NATO. First, it considers 
that NATO is ambivalent about Russia and sees it both a partner and a potential threat; 
second the NRC in practice retains a “28+1” format that leaves it out of the actual 
decision-shaping function; and third, Moscow’s proposals are ignored or rejected. 
NATO’s potential global roles can harm Russian interests; such practical policy issues as 
enlargement and missile defense and NATO’s fading influence in international relations 
are other factors contributing to Russian decision makers’ ambivalence. At an operational  
level, the view regarding NATO’s global posture and interests tends to predominate; at a 
more strategic level, however, NATO’s fading influence causes more concern, if 
membership becomes a consideration.40  
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Particular issues causing concern in the corridors of the Kremlin and eroding the 
trust between parties are basically NATO enlargement, which began in 1990s and its 
more recent decision of this decade to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. There are also other more general concerns of the Kremlin, such as the 
rise of Islamic terrorism and possible Arab Spring-like democratic movements in the 
Northern Caucasus and the Asia. In this sense, while Russia generally supports NATO 
and U.S. policies against terrorism, it finds their views and policies regarding the Arab 
Spring and social movements in the Middle East dangerous and against their national 
interests. It is concerned about the spread of these movements and increasing 
radicalization of marginal Islamist groups within and around its borders.  
Moscow finds the current system unsuccessful in addressing the problems of the 
era and is in pursuit of a new security architecture for a new era, which nonetheless has 
some resonances of the old. Medvedev announced in 2008 Russia’s desire for a new pan-
European security system based on political and military integration of whole Euro-
Atlantic area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Two main reasons strengthen Russia’s 
view on this. First, Russia has begun to see itself and its role in 21st century differently. 
After consolidation of economic and political power, it is confident of its regional 
geopolitical influence and also his potential to be a global one. This has changed 
Moscow’s perception regarding Euro-Atlantic security design as well. Consequently, 
Moscow has been tailoring a more assertive and active role in Euro-Atlantic itself. 
Introduction of such a design would guarantee an equal say and equal status for Moscow. 
The second reason is the belief of Moscow that the current international system, its 
mechanisms and frameworks, is not working. Russia’s proposal for new security 
architecture by asserting the deficiency of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, in this 
regard, is important. This initiative underscores Moscow’s concerns about being left on 






its fragmentation, and confusion in the agendas of existing organizations. It is also a 
reaction to American unilateralism and seeks to create more multi-polar security 
system.41 
C. NATO’S PERSPECTIVE 
For all the structural problems and geopolitical challenges, because of its 
geographic space, economic potential, natural resources, nuclear capabilities, and 
foreign-policy influence, Russia is likely to remain a relevant regional and even global 
power in the foreseeable future.42 Global economic crises and changing geopolitical 
balances that divert the U.S. strategic focus from Europe to Asia and the Pacific have 
significantly augmented the importance of Russia as a neighbor to both regions. 
Therefore, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as of his first day in 
office, put NATO-Russia relations at the top of his agenda. However, the road has been 
rocky and bears many risks. Simply, there has not been a unity among NATO countries 
regarding how to deal with the Russia question. Karsten J. Moller asserts,  
The internal discussions on the New Strategic Concept [2010] are vivid 
proof of the profound disagreement. The ‘old’ members, e.g. Germany, 
France, Italy and now also the United States, wanted to expand 
cooperation with Russia in various fields while the new members, 
primarily Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, supported by the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, looked with deep skepticism on cooperation with 
Russia, a skepticism founded in their historical experiences.43 
From the first strategy document after the Cold War in 1991 to the latest, the 2010 
strategic concept “active engagement, modern defense,” Russia has remained a major 
theme in Allied calculations. However, post–Cold War strategic concepts have handled 
Russia with a different approach and nature. The 1991 strategic concept primarily 
focused on the end of the Cold War and concerns regarding NATO’s raison d’être and 
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purpose in the new era. According to it, Russia was no longer a strategic threat, but still a 
security challenge and a risk-bearing factor. In the following decade, such new threats as 
ethnic conflicts, economic distress, and the proliferation of WMD emerged and changed 
the strategic threat perceptions.  
The Washington Summit of 1999 . . . took place in the context of the 
Kosovo war and NATO’s first round of enlargement into East Central 
Europe, and marked a high point of the Euro- Atlantic’s ability to re-order 
the post communist East through the dual enlargement process (NATO 
and the EU) and humanitarian military intervention.44 
On the other hand, the complexity of the challenges and the experiences in the 
Balkans reveal the need for dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia that 
extends beyond common rhetoric, and eventually this was reflected in the 1999 strategic 
concept in the form of an acknowledgement of Russia’s unique position and its role in 
Euro-Atlantic security, and as a clear message to strengthen relations on the basis of 
common, interest, reciprocity and transparency within the framework of the Founding 
Act (1997).  
At the NATO’s anniversary summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in 2009, members agreed 
on the need for refining the strategic outlook of the Alliance and tasked the secretary 
general with drawing up a new strategic concept. A group of qualified experts, under the 
leadership of former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright, developed 
recommendations for the NATO secretary general in a dialogue-oriented process. The 
group underwent its work in consultation with academics, journalists, decision makers, 
and international organizations in Moscow and Europe, and presented its report to 
Secretary General Rasmussen on 17 May 2010.45 This report formed the basis of the new 
strategic concept adopted at Lisbon Summit in November 2010. 
The 2010 strategic concept, “active engagement, modern defense,” stresses the 
changing character of the security environment and the roles of Alliance. It is a product  
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of an era shaped by the new security threats, crisis-management experiences in the 
Balkans and Afghanistan, and the benefits of cooperative partnerships.46 Adrian Hyde 
claims,  
The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept, “Active Engagement, 
Modern Defense,” were colored by two key international developments: 
the shifting global balance of power and the global recession. These two 
factors provide the key to understanding many of the political and 
strategic decisions reached in Lisbon, and are crucial in defining the 
structural context within which the Alliance now operates.”47 
It is important to deliberate the new strategic concept under the light of such facts 
as the power transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one characterized by the rise 
of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and global economic recession. 
The 2010 concept summarizes, thus, the consensus reached in Lisbon by the 
member states; it inaugurates new approaches without laying down a fixed schedule, and 
positions NATO in the new security environment of the 21st century. It also describes 
NATO’s core tasks and principles, values, and its strategic objectives for the next decade 
in an evolving security environment. 48 The content of the document centers around three 
core tasks: first, defense and deterrence that emphasizes the importance of Article 5 and 
the defensive alliance role, and second, crisis management that points out the necessity of 
taking action before, during, and after conflicts that pose risks to its security. Finally, 
promoting international security through cooperation requires the establishment of 
cooperative dialogues and partnerships with organization and states. 49  
In terms of NATO–Russia relations, the last task, cooperative security, deserves 
more attention. It is rather related to the political aspect of the Alliance. NATO, within 
this context, concentrates its political efforts in three areas: first, arms control, 
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disarmament, and non-proliferation; second, enlargement; and third, partnerships. NATO 
stresses on the need for improvement in relations with Russia and states that its intent is 
to develop a “real strategic partnership” based on common interests and challenges. To 
this end, the strategic concept suggests greater transparency in terms of arsenals and 
reciprocal disarmament, greater focus for conventional arms-control regimes, and broader 
consultation with Russia. Thence, it emphasizes the importance of the NATO-Russia 
Council and indexes full utilization of it.50 Furthermore, unlike the previous one, it does 
not mention imminent joining of new member states, notwithstanding underscoring its 
open-door policy to all European democracies. Particularly, it does not refer to Georgia 
and Ukraine by name, observing Russia’s sensitivity.51 
In practical terms, Adrian Hyde suggests,  
The Lisbon Summit was the occasion for resetting the Russia–NATO 
relationship, based on three tangible areas of cooperation: first, revamping 
the NATO–Russia Council, which has long been regarded as an 
ineffective talking-shop . . . Second, cooperation on theatre missile 
defense: a NATO–Russia Council working group on missile defense will 
be resumed, focusing on creating an ‘Active Layered Theatre Ballistic 
Missile Defense’ (ALTBMD). Third, cooperation on Afghanistan: Russia 
will aid NATO by keeping open land supply routes for non-lethal 
materials and will provide assistance with helicopters to the Afghan 
security forces.52 
In a nutshell, “One of the primary achievements of the Lisbon Summit and a key 
manifestation of the changing constellation of global power relations was the forging of a 
new, more cooperative relationship with the Russian Federation.” 53 The final draft of the 
strategic concept interprets the desire of the NATO countries to improve constructive 
relations with Russia and move towards a full-fledged strategic partnership.54 It has 
become quite obvious that incongruity in the NATO–Russia relations casts a shadow on 
peace and stability in Europe and puts a strain on all Euro-Atlantic security. It is 
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particularly important to note that NATO and Russia agree on ongoing differences 
between each other and openly acknowledge their (well known) disagreements in the 
overcast atmosphere after the Georgian War, and desire to move forward and get over 
them. Thereby, as Klaus Wittmann argues, “The Lisbon Summit [can be] interpreted as a 
breakthrough in NATO’s cooperation with Russia and as a contribution “to creating a 
common space of peace, stability and security.”55  
To conclude, NATO’s perspective regarding Russia embraces a non-
confrontational relationship, which would hopefully transformed in to a “true strategic 
partnership,” on the basis of mutual trust and transparency that is essential for peace and 
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Mindful of their differences and problems and 
willing to eliminate them over the course of time, NATO sees Russia as a potential 
strategic partner that continuously needs to be monitored. All past strategic concepts, 
summit declarations, statements of leaders and top-level officials underline the 
significance of improving relations with Russia. Russia has been and continues to be a 






                                                
55 Wittmann, “An Alliance for the 21st Century?” 
 26 









III. GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA, DISTINCT RUSSIAN IDENTITY, 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS 
OF MOSCOW 
Moscow’s foreign-policy making is shaped and influenced by many factors that 
also determine the prospects of a sound partnership with NATO, more broadly with the 
West. The perspectives of the West and Russia in conceptualizing international order and 
making their foreign policy decisions diverge in many respects. Above all others, the 
geopolitics of Russia and Russian people’s perceived identity are primary factors shaping 
the relations of Russia with the West, and cause divergence. This chapter will analyze, 
first, how the geopolitics and geography of Russia influence Russian foreign policy 
decisions and lead to friction in Russia–NATO relations. Second it will explore how 
Russian identity and its components, European and Asian cultures, historical setting, and 
Orthodox Christianity render Russo-Western relations problematic. 
A. GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS 
Russia’s geography and geopolitics provide an inhospitable home for its peoples. 
Even though the country is full of natural resources, a harsh climate and scarcity of the 
arable lands in addition to strategic disadvantages have led the Russian people to 
experience a history more full of violent and sorrowful days than glorious and happy 
ones. The invasions of Nordic peoples, Western armies (Napoleon and Hitler), and 
Eastern Nomadic nations (Tatars, Mongols, and Turks) and the oppression of their own 
rulers have led them to experience tough lives in a harsh geography. Distilled from past 
experience and current geopolitical realities, Russian conceptualizations of the global 
order and international relations can be defined in rather realistic and rationalist terms. 
As throughout history, geography and the geopolitical position of Russia are two 
key determinant factors in understanding Russian foreign -policy behavior in the 21st 
century. They have provided both obstacles and opportunities for Russian–Western 
relations by influencing Russian foreign policy behavior both directly and indirectly. 
Their direct impact is related to its territorial features and its geographic position, which 
determines its neighbors and the regional political environment. On the other hand, 
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indirectly, their impact on Russia’s security, defense, economy, and culture indirectly 
contribute to the forming of Moscow’s foreign-policy behavior. In addition, the 
perceptions and understanding of the elites, important factors in the making of foreign 
policy, predominantly rely on geopolitical and geographical conditions. Hence, Robert 
Donaldson and Joseph Nogee suggest “The foreign policy of Russia—whether in its 
tsarist, its Soviet, or its democratic form—is an expression in some measure of certain 
relatively fixed geopolitical realities.”56 
Geography and geopolitical position are two important factors in designing the 
security and defense of a country. In this sense, George Friedman claims “Russia’s 
defining characteristic is its indefensibility.”57 Russia’s core geography in particular, 
where the medieval Grand Principality of Muscovy was located, is devoid of natural 
defensive features. It lacks rivers, seas, or mountain ranges on which to rely for defense. 
Russia has always tended to compensate for this vulnerability by expanding whenever 
possible. As a response to continual invasions from west and east, it embraced a strategy 
of expansion and establishing buffers, which came to be characterized as the main foreign 
policy behavior of Russia over time. Thus, Russians developed an obsession with security 
caused by geopolitical and geographic realities—vulnerability to invasions, difficulty of 
maintaining internal order—which can be argued to constitute the main motivation 
behind the expansionist behavior of Russia.58 “At one level,” Thomas Graham points out, 
“Moscow’s fear is a product of Russia’s geopolitical setting, political structure and 
historical experience, all of which have shaped its strategic culture.”59 Even today, this 
insecurity, ossified into Russian strategic thinking, constitutes one of the main 
impediments for closer partnership between Russia and the West. John Erickson suggests 
that a combination of despair and defiance in the 1990s, caused by the huge crisis of 
identity and a challenge to its security with the collapse of Soviet Union, is the reason for 
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the current obsessive preoccupation of Russians with geopolitics and global power 
configurations and their relevance to key issues of Russian national security.60 As a 
result, Russian policymakers have come to believe in the supremacy of realpolitik in 
international relations and conceptualize the international system according to its 
imperatives. They assume that every nation seeks to increase its security and enlarge its 
sphere of influence, and it needs to enhance its hard and soft power to be able to do so. 
Therefore, Russian strategic thinking places a priority on military capabilities over 
political ones.61 
It is impossible to ignore the existence of the sense of insecurity, solidly 
entrenched into Russian strategic thinking over the centuries, especially in the foreign-
policy thinking of the elites and policymakers of the 21st century. This deep-seated angst 
finds venues of expression in Eurasianists and Centrist ideologies, the strongest 
supporters of which are military elites and members of security and intelligence services 
known as the siloviki. For instance, Mankoff asserts that, more than economic growth and 
other factors, Sir Halford John Mackinder’s precepts about “controlling the heartland” 
still preoccupy the minds of elites and policymakers in Moscow.62 Thus, it is fair to assert 
that the sense of insecurity, a natural outcome of Russia’s geography and geopolitical 
imperatives, influences foreign-policy behavior in the 21st century by settling into the 
mindsets of the elites who are the main actors in the making of the Russian Federation’s 
foreign policy.  
Since Ivan III, Russian rulers’ basic principle of Russian foreign policy and 
strategy has mostly been the survival of the state, and then to find ways to promote its 
security by expanding or winning time to regenerate.63  In accordance with this principle, 
Moscow, aware of the weakness of its economic and defense capabilities today, seeks 
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global stability while focusing on domestic consolidation.64 Erickson asserts that Russia 
as a state first “aims at attaining ease within itself,” and second at establishing an 
independent “great space” around itself. He also claims in this regard that Russia 
appreciates “the primacy of economic well-being and social stability as the guarantor of 
national security.”65 Accordingly, Thomas Graham states in his article, ‘The Sources of 
Russia’s Insecurity’ that  
at all times the survival of the empire and the maintenance of its territorial 
integrity were the paramount priorities for Russia’s rulers, before which 
national, religious, economic and other priorities invariably yielded.66 
Consequently, it could be argued that Russian rulers have always had to balance 
the dual task of defending or advancing borders and maintaining domestic order.67 The 
challenge for Moscow since the break-up of the USSR, in this regard, has been 
regenerating the Russian economy, enhancing the domestic social order, and winning 
time while trying to preserve regional and global geopolitical influence  
This dual task of ensuring internal and external security has necessitated strong 
and effective security and intelligence services in addition to a powerful standing 
military. This has led to the consolidation of military and bureaucratic power within the 
Russian state. This reality existed both in the tsarist and Soviet eras. Even today, the 
military and the bureaucracy continue to play strong roles in domestic politics and in the 
making of foreign policy, though at a reduced level. On the other hand, Russian rulers’ 
and policymakers’ second concern, ensuring social cohesion and maintenance of order at 
home, has been a natural consequence of an over-extended territory consisting of a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious society and politically unstable buffers. Holding the vast 
empire together in the face of centrifugal forces has led to the centralization of political 
authority and power and has given way to highly centralized governments throughout 
Russian history, the latest of which is the Putin administration. Authoritarian government 
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and the tendency towards centralization in economics and governance can, in this respect, 
be considered a consequence of Russian geography and geopolitics. 
Russia’s loss of buffer spaces with the disintegration of the USSR and its lack of 
defensible borders in its current situation has constituted a huge crisis for Russian 
strategic thinking, given the history of invasions, internal disorders, and deep-seated 
insecurity. John Erickson expresses similar thoughts by presenting more concrete 
evidence in conformity with the 21st century’s geostrategic thinking:  
A shrunken Russia lost heavily in the geostrategic and geo-economic 
stakes: reduced access to the sea, loss of port facilities, shut off as a 
‘northern-continental country’ like some obscure corner of Europe. Russia 
was deprived of key elements of its strategic early warning system and air 
defense capabilities, vulnerability magnified by the reduction in the 
number of airfields available. The security of lengthy land and maritime 
frontiers fell to a shrinking military force.68 
Consequently, the overemphasis in Russian foreign policy agendas on relations 
with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—for instance, in 
the so-called Medvedev Doctrine of 2008 and recently in Putin’s executive order on 
foreign policy in 2012—can be considered part of the outcome of Russia’s traditional 
reflex of expanding and establishing buffers in a bid for security, although via more 
peaceful methods this time. In this regard, Russian overreaction and opposition to NATO 
enlargement, which has already penetrated into the area of “privileged interests” and 
happens to include some CIS members, is quite understandable. 
Russia’s geography and geopolitical position have negative consequences for its 
economy and foreign policy, even though it possesses rich natural resources. In addition 
to the vastness of its territory, unfavorable weather conditions render any commercial 
activity impossible in some regions, hinder exploitation of some resources, cripple 
transportation, and complicate the establishment of a sustainable trade network within the 
country. Its geopolitical position also denies direct access to oceanic ports and global 
trade routes and circumvents foreign trade. The absence of ice-free ports, needed on 
commercial and military grounds, concerns Moscow much and constitutes another 
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motivation for Russia’s expansionist behavior.69 Moreover, the shortage of arable lands 
limits the production of foods and sometimes leads the Russian state to fail in meeting the 
demands of population. Thus, Russian geography hinders the creation of a strong 
diversified economy, leads to foreign trade dominated by the exportation of natural 
resources, creates vulnerability, and prevents Russia from pursuing more assertive 
foreign policies.  
In the 21st century, despite the economic and political achievements of the Putin 
administration, a fundamental threat to Russia’s territorial and political integrity 
continues to exist. However, it is different from former threats. The global economic and 
geopolitical order is starkly different from twenty years before. Unlike before, other 
dynamic political entities and regions are active in Russia’s traditional sphere of 
influence. China and India keep rising politically and economically in the East and South. 
Russia is also quite concerned about the threat of fundamentalist Islam to Central Asia, 
emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan in the South. And last but not least, Europe lies 
to the West and remains an influential actor in global economics and politics in spite of 
the current crisis. Contrary to the former Russia’s dynamism and outward expansionist 
pattern, today there is contraction in the geopolitical space of Russia and dynamism in the 
regions surrounding it.70  
Russo–Sino relations need more elaboration. China is the most imminent potential 
threat for Moscow, particularly given Russia’s demographic decline, especially in its Far 
East, despite seemingly good relations between the two political entities. Like other 
global powers, China’s rise means a lot to Russia. Its proximity to Russian borders and 
strategic backyard—Central Asia—causes concern and fear, even if the Kremlin does not 
let it show. China’s growing interest, political and economic influence, and energy 
investments in Central Asia, for instance, which Russia considers its backyard, 
undermine Russia’s interests and deprive it of the political leverage it has been using 
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against Central Asian countries.71 Long-standing territorial issues in the Far East—
notwithstanding they were resolved during Putin’s first term as president—and the 
growing demographic, economic, and political influence of China, both within the eastern 
borders of Russia and former Soviet space, ignite concerns in the corridors of the 
Kremlin, no matter how much Putin administration tries to hold it back and establish 
better relations with China. Realistically, Moscow has no other option. To Lo, it is the 
only way for Russia to reconcile a resurgent China and create a protective mechanism 
against this power rising along its eastern borders.72 Kaczmarski asserts that Russians are 
aware of the shift of balance in favor of China and the waning of U.S. hegemony that 
“served as glue” for Russian-Chinese cooperation; however, they lack the capacity to end 
this engagement.73 On the other hand, according to Kuchins, Russia’s close engagement 
with China has been considered a part of its counterbalancing behavior against Western 
dominance.74  In sum, strategic convenience, pragmatism and a commonality of interests 
serve as the basis for the Russia-China partnership in today’s geopolitical setting.75  
In the 2000s, the shift of power in the strategic equation in Southeast Asia has 
become more apparent and the economic and demographic gap between Russia and 
China has become even larger; ergo, Russia will be paying more attention to resurgent 
China rising along its eastern border and deliberating more on Asian geopolitics. Russia 
will have to stop hiding its concern and overtly face the reality and seek to 
counterbalance China by either building closer ties with the West or finding allies in 
South and East Asia. In this sense, some scholars regard the reset in U.S.-Russia 
relations, as evidence of Russia’s covert concern over rising China. Russia, overall, 
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seems to be securing itself by seeking a balance between aligning with other powers and 
engaging China politically and economically. Considering the U.S.’s concerns over 
Southeast Asian and its shift of focus toward this region, along with China’s rise, will 
serve as an incentive for increased cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, and 
accordingly between NATO and Russia. 76 
Russian identity is also to some extent a function of geography and geopolitical 
position. Extending from Europe to the Bering Sea, Russia possesses an identity 
combining European and Asian cultural elements. Whether Russia is Asian or European 
has been widely debated among elites and politicians, both in the West and Russia, for 
centuries. The answer of the Russian people to the question of who they are is important, 
since the perceived identity of a country matters much in establishing foreign-policy 
goals. Commenting on the foreign-policy goals of 21st century Russia, Mankoff asserts, 
“The new approach to foreign policy rested on a deep-seated consensus among the 
Russian elite about the nature of international relations and about the identity of Russia as 
a state.”77 Therefore, it is meaningful to analyze Russian identity and culture with respect 
to their influence on Russian foreign policy and, accordingly, on Russia’s relations with 
the West. 
B. RUSSIAN IDENTITY  
Russian identity, a product of a consensus among Russian public opinion and 
elites, is the other key determinant factor providing foundations for Russian foreign 
policy and influencing Russian–NATO relations. Identity influences Russia’s foreign 
policy decisions, most importantly by shaping the perceptions of the Russian elites and 
common people. The subject of furious debate during the past twenty years, Russian 
identity, accordingly, is an essential element in Russian strategic thinking and provides 
both opportunities and obstacles in the troubled relations between Russia and the West.  
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Identity is a highly complex concept, comprising the elements of history, culture, 
social psychology, and politics.78 In the Russian case, also, the people’s knotty history, 
the legacy of two hundred years of Mongol–Turkic Horde rule (between 1238 and 1480), 
hundreds of years of tsarist rule that gave Russians both suffering and pride, the impact of 
Prince Vladimir’s choice of Orthodox Christianity, the experience with socialism, the 
social policies of Stalin, geography, geopolitics, and finally the breakup of a great 
political project combined in the formation of Russian identity. And of course, 
contemporary developments keep molding it every moment, since identity is a dynamic, 
not a stagnant, concept and keeps evolving over time. Russian identity, as well, keeps 
being influenced by global developments, international interactions, and domestic 
experiences, evolving dynamically over the course of time. That is to say, contemporary 
political and economic currents within and outside of the borders of Russia and the 
relations with foreign entities are influencing, and being influenced by, Russian identity. 
It is beneficial here to look at what the contemporary agreed-upon Russian 
identity is and how it has taken shape after the disappearance of the political ideology and 
dissolution of the USSR. We will then analyze the ideological streams and debates on 
what it means to be a Russian. 
Russia has an identity divided between West and the East, autocratic past and 
democratic aspirations, and realities of the day and nostalgia for a “glorious” past. 
Throughout history, Russian rulers and thinkers tried to answer whether Russia is 
culturally and socially closer to the West or the East, and whether it belongs to Eastern or 
Western civilization, or both, or neither. What it means to be a Russian is relevant in 
conceptualizing the nature of its international politics and formation of foreign-policy 
perceptions and behaviors, since culture affects the strategic behavior of a country. 
It is almost impossible to define “the Russians” anatomically, physiologically, or 
genetically since the biological heritage of the Russians is extremely diverse. Russians 
are widely considered to descend from such different ethnic groups as Finns, Ukrainians, 
Tatars, Mongols, Germans, Swedes, etc. Even in the core of Russia, the region around 
                                                
78 Peter J S. Duncan, “Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West.” The Historical Journal 
48. 1 (March 2005): 282. 
 36 
Moscow, the Russians are not from a single ancestral group.79 “Russianness” has been a 
term constructed psychologically, socially, or culturally, but certainly not biologically. 
This is not to say that a sense of nationhood grew in Russian lands. A national 
consciousness, a national identity, or a nation-state building process did not develop 
throughout Russian history. 
Both in the imperial and Soviet era, formation of a nation and a nation state was 
ignored; Russians failed to develop an ethnic consciousness and solidarity. However, the 
Soviet system contributed to the emergence of a national consciousness. The use of 
Russian as a lingua franca, the Russian-dominated leadership, and the national victory 
against Nazi Germany nurtured this identity to a certain extent. 80 In addition, Donaldson 
and Nogee point out:  
Russia has never existed as a nation-state; rather, during both the tsarist 
and Soviet periods it had been multinational empire with messianic 
ambitions. Unlike other European imperial states, the modern Russian 
nation was not formed prior to the period of colonial expansion. 
Moreover, the tsars, unlike the rulers of Britain or France, colonized lands 
that bordered on their home territories, thus producing an unusual 
intermixing of Russian and non-Russian peoples.81 
Dmitri Trenin notes accordingly, “Post-imperial Russia did not experience a 
rebirth as a nation-state, like post–World War II democratic Germany or the republican 
Kemalist Turkey. It did not shrink to a small fragment, a souvenir of past imperial glory, 
like post-1918 Deutsch-Oesterreich, which became the Republic of Austria.”82 
Consequently, during the imperial experiences in the tsarist and Soviet eras, Russia failed 
to develop a strong sense of nationhood; above all, the multinational character of tsarist 
and Soviet Russia curbed the development of such a sense, as Peter Duncan asserts. He 
goes on to explain that the dissolution of the Soviet state and ideology’s official power 
left a “conceptual void” in foreign-policy thinking and national identity. Hence, Yeltsin, 
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later found it sensible to create a civic identity, which maintains a multiethnic and multi-
religious character that provides a legitimate basis for the post-Soviet Russian 
Federation.83 
Since the beginning of 1990s, with the break-up of the USSR—and even a little 
before, Russia has been experiencing an identity crisis. “Stripped of the geopolitical and 
ideological certainties at the heart of Soviet politics, contemporary Russia has been 
forced to answer a series of fundamental questions about its relationship to the post–Cold 
War world system and its own identity as a state,” Jeffrey Mankoff suggests. 84 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s answer to this crisis was Westernization, embracing the 
democratic and free-market values of the West, getting rid of all the legacies of the 
totalitarian past, and constructing a new civic identity that would encompass all ethnic 
groups within its vast borders. Defining citizens in purely civic terms was certainly a 
brave attempt that would bring all peoples within the borders of Russia under a common 
roof, given that the communist or nationalist opposition has not welcomed promotion of 
such a civic identity. 85 With respect to the deep question of a definition for Russian 
identity, Vera Tolz provides five different perspectives prevalent in the post-Soviet 
period: 
1. The Union, or imperial, identity sees the Russians as destined to create and 
maintain a multi-national state. This includes nationally minded 
communists, ultra-nationalists and Eurasianists. Russia, in whatever form, 
must be great power and a strong state. 
2. The view that assumes the Russian nation as a community of Eastern 
Slavs comprised of Russians, Ukrainians, and, Belarusians. Those 
branches of “East Slavonic tree” speak close languages; share a common 
faith, Orthodox Christianity. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is the most 
prominent adherent of this view that suggests a federation among three 
states or of their union in a single all-Russian state.    
3. Russian nation is comprised of the people who use Russian as their first 
language whatever their ethnicity is. That requires redrawing of Russian 
frontiers and lacks a significant political support. 
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4. A racial definition of Russianness by blood that aims excluding Jews and 
peoples from the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
5. A civic definition that embraces all citizens of the Russian Federation.86 
Among them, the civic definition has been officially accepted in the post-Soviet 
Era. On November 28, 1991, the law adopted by the Russian Federation refers to Russian 
citizens in strictly civic terms, i.e., Rossiiane.87 And later, Yeltsin and then Putin adopted 
the promotion of a civic identity and a non-ethnic definition of nationhood, and have also 
used the word Rossiianin, which does not have an ethnic connotation, instead of Russkii. 
However, leaders in practice have tended to extend the definition of ethnic Russianness to 
include the Russian-speaking population, in some part because of the demands and 
necessities of the new demographic distribution in Russia. It has never been an easy task 
to take into account the proportion of the ethnic Russian-speaking population in the 
Russian Federation, which, unlike in the Soviet era, during when they composed slightly 
more than half the population, now account for four-fifths of the population, while such 
ethnic minorities as Chechens and Tatars now form a tenth. On the other hand, growing 
support for nationalists and communists has rendered the extension in the definition of 
identity inevitable. That is to say, currently accepted civic identity in Russia, in some 
ways, reconciles the demands of the people and goals of policymakers and elites and 
transcends the civic definition tilting toward ethnicity. 88 
The rising support for communism and the nostalgia for the great Soviet past led 
President Boris Yeltsin to relax the civic definition of the Russian identity and temper the 
stance of categorical rejection of the communist legacy. As a result of the continuing 
presence of the imperial and Soviet legacies, Yeltsin even had to bring back the imperial 
two-headed eagle as the state emblem. Putin later took over this stance of Yeltsin’s and 
went even further, praising the achievements of the Soviet Union in many of  his public 
speeches. Putin, restored the Soviet national anthem as the Russian Federation’s anthem, 
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with a few alterations in lyrics. Both Yeltsin and his successor, Putin, sought to reconcile 
the new civic identity of the Russian Federation with the positive aspects of tsarist and 
Soviet legacies that could be useful for promoting a multiethnic identity. 89    
C. ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT? 
Russian nationalism has gained strength in the post-Soviet era as a reaction to 
unfavorable conditions and political developments as well as enduring features of 
political culture and tradition. In addition to nostalgia for the past, poor economic 
conditions, over-subordination to the West, and enlargement of NATO into Eastern 
Europe have nurtured nationalist feelings in the Russian elite and people. Reaction to 
these factors and the deep-seated insecurities of Russians came together, and a wave of 
anti-Westernism took root in Russian politics.90 
Putin’s nationalism is essentially state-centered, and pragmatic in many ways.91 It 
is neither obsessively nationalist nor anti-Western; it is, rather, pragmatic. According to 
Duncan, in a comparison that may apply to the 21st century or not, “The regime [Putin’s 
era] was reminiscent of Peter the Great, who introduced some Westernizing reforms 
while strengthening autocracy and serfdom.”92 While consolidating centralized power 
and pursuing economic reform at home, Putin has sought to cooperate with the West to 
obtain trade and technology, in order to strengthen the state, as Peter did in the beginning 
of the eighteenth century with the European system and the society of his age at which 
time such reform from above was the norm in the northern courts of the Romanovs, the 
Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs. The leadership rejects ethnic Russian nationalism, 
seeing itself as the heir of the Soviet multinational state. It forcibly incorporated the 
Chechens and is still putting economic and political pressure on some of the former  
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Soviet republics. The use of both tsarist and Soviet symbols reflect that the Russian 
Federation was far from being a nation-state, but neither did it attempt to revive the 
empire. 
Russia has always been confused between nostalgia for the past and the attraction 
towards the West. The conflict between these two incompatible ideas has never been 
resolved throughout modern Russian history. Russia’s troubled journey toward the West 
started with the energetic and enthusiastic ruler Peter the Great in the seventeenth 
century. Stunned by the developments and progress of the West, Peter had always aspired 
for the Russian Empire to achieve the West’s level of civilization. He believed that by 
following the Western way and adopting Western institutions without question, Russia 
could bridge the gap with the West. His reforms and efforts left an indelible impact on 
the Russian psyche. The West has always set the standard for Russia to reach or overtake. 
On the other hand, beginning from Peter’s era, opposition to the idea of Westernization 
has never ceased. The Slavophiles suggested promoting Russian tradition and Russian 
culture rather than simply copying the West. For the Slavophiles, Russian tradition and 
culture meant what they imagined to be Russian society before Peter the Great. Struggles 
between Slavophiles and Westernizers have been an intrinsic part of Russian politics.93 
The essential difference between Slavophiles and Westernizers was over the 
question of whether, in borrowing from European culture, Russia was rejecting its own 
nature and culture or taking the necessary steps for its regeneration and progress: 
Slavophiles supported the former, Westernizers the latter.94  The struggle between them 
gained new strength with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amid the social, economic, 
and moral ruins of the empire, between nostalgia for the past and the promise of the 
West, Russian people were to decide their own fate. Duncan summarizes the situation as 
follows: 
The centuries-old question regarding whether Russia should become part 
of the West, or follow its own unique Eastern path, acquired new interest 
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after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. For Westernizers 
in Russia, the ‘West’ symbolized progress, freedom, democracy, civil 
society, normality, and a nation-state. Their opponents saw the West as 
representing capitalist exploitation, moral decadence, and American 
dominance. Westernizers saw the ‘East’ as linked with autocracy, 
despotism, and empire. Their opponents admired precisely these features, 
which for them signified a strong state, unity, and order. 95  
Richard Sakwa suggests, “As in all countries, but particularly in those which once 
gloried in an imperial past, the present is viewed through the prism of historical concerns 
and achievements. In the Russian case this is reinforced by a double historical tradition, 
the Soviet and the tsarist.”96 The past imperial power achieved by first tsarist and then 
Soviet Russia is always a temptation and motivation for following a distinct track from 
the West’s, no matter how strong the promise of the West. Sakwa also claims that this 
“self-appreciation” of Russia, caused partly by its imperial experiences, is the reason 
behind the Russia’s problematic relationship with the hegemonic international system. 
Moscow’s demand to maintain its autonomy and to be treated on equal terms arguably 
caused by the same reason, according to Sakwa. Overall, one of the unique features of the 
post-Soviet Russian reassertion has been the intersection of great-power status and 
democratic agendas, which clearly reflect the dilemma of the Russian psyche.97  
Russia’s second dilemma has been its indecisiveness regarding democracy and 
autocracy. While Western values gradually took hold in Russian culture, beginning with 
Peter I, Russia’s distinct religious track (since 988), the strong influence of Mongol, 
Tatar, and Turkic heritages, and experience with communism have driven a wider wedge 
with the West. Russia’s Asiatic features inherited from the Mongols and their successor 
Turkic Khanates remain influential in the culture, society, and state. Richard Pipes asserts 
that Moscow learned about kingship and central authority “as a working institution” from 
the Golden Horde; and Russian historians attribute a significant role to Mongols in the 
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formation of Russian statehood.98 Under the absolute domination of the Golden Horde, 
Muscovy inherited all the state institutions of the “Sarai,” the capital of the Golden 
Horde, most importantly the central political authority. The large volume of Turkic and 
Tatar vocabulary in state terminology, such as treasury kazna and turnover tax tamga, is 
evidence of this influence. On the other hand, Russia inherited many institutions and 
ecclesiastical traditions, including the title “tsar” for their emperors, from Byzantine, 
which put distance between Russia and the Western Roman Empire, and thus the West, 
since the sixth century. Overall, it is sensible to argue that Mongol, Turkic, and Byzantine 
influence on Russian culture impede its integration with the West.99 
Patrimonialism and statism, in this regard, are important aspects of Russian 
identity that reflect its eastern ancestry and heritage. Russians, both in the tsarist and 
Soviet eras, chose to subordinate individual interests for group interests or state interest—
a custom not unknown to continental Europeans in turn. The primacy of the group has 
always been in the Russian psyche. Taking into account the Turkic and Mongol 
patrimonial and collectivist thinking, favoring group needs over individual needs, that 
distilled into Russian culture, it could be argued that Russia lacks individualism, a 
defining characteristic of the West, as a result of its interactions with the Asian societies. 
The experience with communism had also great impact on Russian culture. It 
aggravated the centuries old political cultural cleavages between the Orthodox world and 
Western Christianity, namely between Russia and the West. Building upon the Golden 
Horde legacy, communism consolidated authoritarianism in Russia. After all, in the wake 
of the collapse of communism, it would be very naïve to expect Russian society to adopt 
Westernization and democratic values overnight, inasmuch as change in a culture 
requires a certain time span.100 
Ronald Inglehart argues that culture is “past dependent,” and if the effects of 
economic development are controlled, different societies, such as historically Protestant, 
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Orthodox, Islamic, or Confucian societies, develop highly distinctive value systems.101  
He categorizes societies in two ways: first in terms of survival versus secular rational 
orientations. To him, while societies that have survival values and traditional orientation 
have autocratic tendencies, societies that emphasize self-expression are much more likely 
to be stable democracies.102 According to the global cultural map, prepared from data 
collected between 1995 and 1998 by the World Values Survey, Russia belongs in the 
orthodox group with other ex-Communist countries, possessing survival values with an 
emphasis on economic and physical security.103  
A society’s position on the survival/self-expression index is strongly 
correlated with its level of democracy, as indicated by its scores on the 
Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties from 1972 
through 1998. This relationship is powerful. Virtually all of the societies 
that rank high on survival/self-expression values are stable democracies; 
virtually all that rank low has authoritarian governments.104  
It can be concluded from the graphic also, that democracy flourishes in some 
social and cultural contexts more than in others, and in this regard the cultural conditions 
of Russia and other ex-democratic countries in the 1990s was not favorable for 
democracy. Therefore, it would not be sensible to expect a sudden change in Russia and 
that liberal democratic values flourish there overnight. 
History, culture, religion, ideology, and geography all, hand-in-hand, consolidated 
the autarky and oppression within the borders of the Russia. All new ideas or reform 
movements unexceptionally developed from top to bottom and were applied through 
violence and coercion until the end of the 20th century. From Peter’s Westernization 
campaign to Stalin’s industrialization efforts, this reality has not changed. In the late 20th 
century, with the help of leaders such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and the media and press, 
which enable ideas to spread into every layer of society, the Russian people had a chance 
to break this continuity. However, the realities of Russia have impeded, or at least, 
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slowed down the Westernization stream, and Russia’s dilemma between democracy and 
autarky keeps prevailing in domestic political life. 
According to James Billington, “The central struggle in the Soviet break with its 
totalitarian past has been between physical power and moral authority, between a 
dictatorial machine trying to control things at the top and a movement toward democracy 
from below.”105 He argues that the awakening Russian people will be the main actor in 
determining the result of the conflict between deap-seated authoritarianism and bottom-
up democracy movement.106 Looking at developments in last two decades, the former 
has gained strength, whereas the latter has worn off. However, considering the presence 
of popular support and demand for democracy, the chance of Putin’s ignoring it and 
taking a big political risk in the future is quite low.  
D. CONTESTING IDEOLOGIES  
How a state defines itself as statecraft and political culture is a key factor 
influencing its foreign policy, with respect to how it conceptualizes international politics 
and its position in the international stage in constructivist terms. Its area of interest and 
influence, in what alliances it should participate in, and many other questions regarding 
its strategic interests and decisions are quite relevant to its definition of itself. Naturally, 
an agreed-upon identity is shaped by many factors, ranging from culture and history to 
geography. And it is usually a product of a rocky process of conflicting views or 
ideologies ending with a compromise or domination of one over others. Conflicting 
views are influenced by each other; there is give and take. In the Russian case as well, the 
21st century agreed-upon identity is the product of a long process, synthesizing many 
views and characterized by competition over the definition of “Russian” and the way 
Russia should achieve a genuine great-power status. 
Since the mid-1980s, and particularly after the dissolution of the USSR, different 
political currents and ideologies have clashed over what the definition of Russian identity 
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and how Russia’s foreign policy and interactions with the post–-Cold War international 
system should be. At the turn of the century, Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s policies aiming at 
integration with the West, were replaced by an independent approach of Putin’s, once 
they confronted domestic opposition and foreign skepticism. This independent foreign-
policy approach, distinct from those of the liberal capitalist West, is basically a product of 
the Russian elite’s “deep-seated consensus” over the identity of Russia as a state and the 
nature of international relations.107 The despair, defiance, and existential crisis 
experienced by the Russians with the collapse of communism and unprecedented 
strategic contraction, played an important role in the strengthening of anti-Western ideas 
and a unique and independent Russian way.108 
The mainstream of political thought since mid-1800s in Russia has always been 
the Slavophile. Richard Pipes points out that the Slavophile has become the most pivotal 
current in Russian intellectual history.109 The “Slavophile theory” was born as a reaction 
to German thinkers’ dismissal of the contributions of the Slavs to the advance of 
civilization and their relegation of Slavs to the category of “unhistoric nations.”110 This 
fueled a big controversy within the Russian intelligentsia in the late 1830s, Richard Pipes 
asserts.111  He notes that in 1836, Peter Chaadaev argued, in line with German thinkers, 
that Russia did not contribute to the advance of civilization at all, by adding that it was a 
‘historic swampland’ without a past and future. To Chaadaev, this was so because Russia 
had inherited Christianity from a “polluted source,” Byzantium, which led to its isolation 
from the West. Ultimately, his essay started a controversy that has never ceased since 
then and split the Russian intelligentsia in two: Slavophiles and Westernizers.112 
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“According to the Slavophile theory the fundamental difference between Russia 
and the West were traceable to religion.”113 Slavophiles believed that Orthodoxy 
remained devoted to true Christian ideals, while Western Christianity was influenced by 
the classical cultures, rationalism, and excessive pride. The collective faith and wisdom 
of the flock drove its strength, and unlike the West’s individualistic and legalistic mind, 
“[the] communal spirit formed the quintessential feature of Russian national character 
and provided the basis of all Russian institutions.” 114 Above all, the fantastic 
idealization of the past led Slavophiles to conclude that Russia was the country of the 
future, destined to abolish the chains around the neck of mankind and eliminate all 
political and class conflicts. 115  
On the other hand, there was no unity among the opponents of the Slavophiles, 
except rejection of their ideas as ignorant and utopian. Pipes points out that “they [anti-
Slavophiles] did not deny that Russia was different from the West, but they explained this 
difference by her backwardness rather than uniqueness.”116 They were just adopting the 
view that Russia needed to get rid of its past and traditions and take a new way, the 
Western way.  
During the years following the disintegration of the USSR, the historical contest 
between Slavophiles and Westernizers over Russian identity transformed into a debate 
between nationalists, Eurasianists, and Westernizers.  
As a consequence of social and economic bankruptcy toward the end of the Soviet 
era, the pro-Western camp raised its voice and called for reform and regeneration that 
would transform Russia into a liberal democratic state and a member of the free world. 
Many of them favored cooperation with the West, adherence to international norms, and 
integration with Western institutions. To them, the journey towards becoming a part of 
Western civilization that started with the reforms of Peter and was interrupted by the 
Bolshevik Revolution and totalitarian rule of Stalin should be resumed and completed. 
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Gorbachev and Yeltsin were strong adherents of the Westernization of policies and the 
belief that Russia is historically and culturally a European power that will eventually 
integrate into the West. Former prime ministers Yegor Gaidar and Sergei Krienko and 
foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev were also prominent members of the Westernist camp. 
However, the optimism and support to Westernizers withered away as Yeltsin failed to 
jumpstart the Russian economy and national pride. Nevertheless, as Mankoff emphasizes, 
liberal and Westernist ideas have still been represented well among the Russian 
intelligentsia and garner support from many educated Russians.117 And they influence, 
particularly, the economic policies of Russia and its interactions with the global 
economic system. 
A prominent thinker in Westernizer camp and a career military-intelligence 
officer, Dmitri Trenin, argues that Russia is both historically and culturally part of 
Europe and its survival depends on its ability to transform itself and embrace Western 
liberal democratic values. To him, Russia should focus on economic opportunity, growth, 
and development, and abandon its great-power fantasies. Germany and Japan, in the 
post–World War II era, should set the example for Russian thinkers and policymakers 
looking for a strategy in the 21st century, according to Trenin.118 
The implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union were substantial; failure of 
social and economic policies and ongoing existential crisis led to the dissolution of the 
immediate optimism and appetite for Westernization, and to the consolidation of 
nationalist currents. Russian nationalism, Jeffrey Mankoff notes, is a loose collection of 
groups and activist that are prone to racial policies. They usually prefer “a smaller and 
more homogenous Russia,” in a kind of “fortress Russia” mentality, rather than a larger 
and integrated Russia within the post-Soviet space. Expansionism does not take 
precedence in their agenda. Their policies aim at opposing Chinese immigrants to the 
Russian Far East and Muslim Republics to the south, in rather xenophobic tones.   The 
Movement Against Illegal Immigration, (Dvizhenie protivv nelegal’noi immigratsii, 
DPNI) is the most popular nationalist political organization, conveying discontent and 
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anxiety about the future among ethnic Russians.119 Russian nationalists, who are 
preoccupied with immigration issues and the former Muslim Republics of the USSR, get 
along well with the West and do not reject cooperation between Russia and the West.  
To Eurasianists, Mankoff points out, “Russia’s fundamental identity and hence 
foreign policy priorities, are linked to its geographical position at the crossroads between 
Europe and Asia.”120 Eurasianism encompasses different tones on a spectrum of political 
approaches: aggressive and imperial on one end and softer, synthesizing the views of 
Westernizers and Slavophiles in a third way, on the other end. Mankoff asserts that they 
typically attempt to justify their aggressiveness by citing Zbigniew Brezinski’s 
formulation for the post–Cold War international order: a “grand chessboard.”121  
Eurasianists imagine a Russia comprising the former Soviet space. built upon a unique 
Eurasian civilization. They see the West as a natural geopolitical competitor.122 
Since the Primakov era, however, a balanced compromise among these ideas, 
what is called centrism, has shaped Moscow’s foreign policy. Yevgeny Primakov, 
serving as foreign minister to Yeltsin between 1996 and 1998, pursued a balanced 
foreign-policy course aimed at restoration of Russia as a leading power. He was not anti-
Western, yet rejected a subservient relationship to the West. He stressed the image of 
Russia as a great power and the need to design a foreign policy centering on this core 
idea. In this regard, Primakov offered four foreign policy tasks:  First, “creating external 
conditions conducive to strengthening the country’s territorial integrity;” second, 
“strengthening processes of reintegration, especially in the economy, in the former 
USSR;” third, “settling regional and interethnic conflicts in the CIS and former 
Yugoslavia,” and last, preventing the creation of new areas of tension and proliferation of 
WMDs.123 Remembering the priorities of Russian foreign policy today, articulated in 
what some have termed as “the Medvedev doctrine,” there are many similarities among 
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the foreign policy outlooks of these periods. Thus, it is fair to argue that many tendencies 
in Russian foreign policy attributed to Vladimir Putin constitute continuity since the mid-
1990s.124 Mankoff suggests, “Less an ideological movement than an attempt to 
synthesize the competing priorities of the other three camps . . . Russian centrism has 
remained the dominant approach since around 1993–1994, precisely because of its 
success in appealing to a broad constituency among the elite.”125 In line with the centrist 
tendency, different groups have united over the notion that Russia is an independent great 
power and should play a pivotal role in world affairs. 126 Centrism reflects, thus, a 
compromise over the debate about whether Russia is European or Asian, and to which 
civilization it belongs. 
Centrism provides a geopolitical view combining Eurasians’ emphasis on 
Russia’s regional and global leading role and Westernizers’ suggestion of non-
confrontational, productive relations with the West. It is the manifestation of the 
consensus over Russian identity as a result of a thorny process. Centrists favor a foreign 
policy balancing the attention devoted to interests and obligations in the West and the 
East. While they support Russia’s central, leading role in the former Soviet space, they 
avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. and Europe. On the other hand, good relations 
with the West, which they see essential for economic progress, should not lead them to 
disregard their hinterland, Asia. According to what centrists called the “multivectoral 
approach to foreign policy,” Russia should balance its efforts toward the West and its 
neighbors in Central and East Asia and avoid getting into a position that would 
necessitate making a selection between them. Overall, Russia’s ongoing close relations 
with China (its decision to sell high-tech weapons for instance) and Iran (such as 
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on CIS countries in recent foreign-policy documents—simultaneously its efforts to 
normalize relations with West—could be considered within the context of this 
multivectoral approach.127 
Russia has been cautious in its relations with the West and avoided committing to 
a full-scale security integration that will subordinate it to the U.S. or EU. It favors 
arrangements among great powers that enable it to have equal voice, like the UN Security 
Council. Despite its full support to the U.S. after the September 11 attacks, for instance, 
Russia insisted on a partnership that would be based on equality. Even some centrists 
tilted toward Westernizers, favoring integration with the EU and cooperation with the 
U.S., suggesting that this happen in a way that allows Russia to protect its identity and 
historical features.128 
In sum, centrism is a manifestation of compromise over the question of what 
Russian identity is. It comprises features of the nationalist, Eurasianist, and Westernist 
currents. In Moscow’s foreign-policy design since Primakov’s term, centrism, a rational 
and balanced compromise of Russian political and strategic currents, has been the main 
approach of Russian foreign policy. With regard to cooperation between Russia and the 
West, more specifically between Russia and NATO, centrism provides many 
opportunities, since it favors a long-term rapprochement between Russia and the West, 
and aims for a productive, non-confrontational relationship.  
E. RELIGION  
Russia’s denominational choice had a deep impact on its identity. Orthodoxy 
distanced Russia’s fate from the West and led to quite a distinct social character. After a 
breakup with religion during the Soviet era, Russia has enjoyed a religious revival since 
Gorbachev. Directly and indirectly, Orthodox Christianity contributed to Russia’s lonely 
player image and influenced how it sees itself and world politics. It has led to Russia’s 
isolation from Western civilization and contributed to its lagging behind the social and 
economic progress experienced by the West. 
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At the end of 10th century, Prince Vladimir of Kiev embraced Eastern 
Christianity under the influence of Constantinople and its Patriarch.129 Constantinople’s 
political and economic superiority over Rome, its geographical proximity, emissaries sent 
from Hagia Sofia, and commercial activity with Byzantine merchants were important 
factors behind Orthodox belief’s expansion into Russian lands. Among scholars studying 
Russian identity, the consequences of this marriage of Russia and Orthodox Christianity 
have commanded more attention than the reasons for its happening. It can be argued that 
Orthodoxy is one of the factors alienating Russia from the West. Richard Pipes writes, 
“The fact that Russia received its Christianity from Byzantium rather than from the West 
had the most profound consequences for the entire course of Russia’s historic 
development.”130 As a result of the decision of Prince Vladimir, Russia became separated 
from the mainstream of Christianity. Lately and perhaps most importantly, for instance, 
during the Enlightenment age and industrial revolution, which led to civilizational leaps 
in the West, while Western religious leaders were seeking ways to accommodate faith to 
science and the needs of society, the Russian patriarchy was moving in the opposite 
direction, “towards renunciation, mysticism, hypnosis, and ecstasy.”131 
Moscow’s inheritance of Orthodox leadership from Byzantium after the conquest 
of Constantinople by the Ottomans had serious impacts on the Russian psyche and 
identity. In 1589, the Russian church became autocephalous, and the Moscow patriarchy 
was established. From this time on, the Church’s influence in society increased 
considerably. In the 16th century, Moscow was the only large kingdom in support of this 
eastern Christianity, which made it the target of assaults by Catholicism and Islam. As a 
consequence the Russian Church became increasingly intolerant. Russia felt lonelier than 




                                                
129 Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 221. 
130 Ibid., 223. 
131 Ibid., 222. 
 52 
Orthodox leadership nurtured its ego and self-appreciation even more. This was another 
factor isolating Russia from its neighbors and the West and establishing a leadership role 
into the Russian subconscious. 132 
The Orthodox Church has never had a power and authority equivalent to the 
Catholic Church in the West. The state’s authority always eclipsed their influence and 
power. Though it enjoyed a golden age during Mongol domination, when it was granted 
protection and exemption from tribute and taxes, it has never accumulated considerable 
wealth and was never centrally controlled, as the Catholic Church was in Western 
Europe. Even so, it had semi-autonomy and institutional identity until Peter the Great 
changed it, subjugating it entirely to the state, abolishing the patriarchate, and 
transforming it into a branch of state administration. He deprived it of many of its 
privileges and incomes as well. On the other hand, Peter and his successors merely saw 
the church as an essential component of Russianness and used it as a tool for exerting a 
homogenization policy by forcing non-Orthodox people under their rule to adopt 
Orthodoxy. As a result, from its introduction to the end of the tsarist era, to a decreasing 
degree but in an increasingly lasting way, a close connection was formed between 
Russianness and Orthodoxy. 133 
The Bolshevik Revolution, and subsequently almost a century-long experience 
with socialism, created a wedge between Russianness and Orthodoxy. In the Soviet era, 
anti-church policies and the suppression of clergy, common believers, and any symbol of 
religion in society, art, and culture led to a diminishing influence of religion in Russian 
identity. That is not to say Soviet leaders never resorted to religious motives. From time 
to time, when circumstances necessitated, such as during World War II, when patriotic 
feelings needed to be stirred, this general approach against religion was violated by  
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Soviet leaders. However, it would be fair to say that during the Soviet era, the Orthodox 
Church’s influence on society and Russian identity reduced remarkably, if not vanished 
entirely.134 
With glasnost and perestroika, the anti-religious policies of the Soviet era were 
amended and a religious regeneration was introduced for Russian people. Religious 
institutions were revitalized and the Orthodox Church began to reconstitute its influence. 
While the popularity of Orthodoxy was reinstated, the number of atheists decreased 
remarkably in the post-Soviet period. What is widely called a “religious revival,” 
arguably, could be associated also with economic, social, and political collapse and 
wounded national pride. It was what the nation needed in a time of serious crises or when 
an existential threat appeared.  
To conclude, Orthodoxy is one of the key elements of contemporary Russian 
identity. It also is a factor in Russian development of an identity distinct from Western 
Europe. Its unchanging subservience to state and the way it enhanced submission instead 
of tolerance in society contributed to the authoritarian political culture in Russia. Since 
1453, when Russia became the leading and almost the only representative of Orthodox 
states, the sense of insecurity and self-appreciation in Russian psyche has consolidated. 
The denominational choice of Russia has contributed to its lonely player image and the 
realist way it conceptualizes international politics. It has led to Russia’s isolation from 
Western civilization and lagging behind the social and economic progress of the West.  
F. CONCLUSION   
Russian foreign policy is the product of the combination of historical, cultural, 
religious, and geopolitical factors with the rational choices of the Russian elite and 
people. From rule of the tsars and general secretaries of the Communist Party to 
Orthodoxy, and from its Asian and European cultural heritage to geographic and 
geopolitical realities, many elements influence the foreign policy designs of Kremlin. 
These realities help scholars better understand Russia’s foreign-policy behavior and help 
them make projections about the future decisions and moves of Russia.   
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Russia’s geographic and geopolitical realities help explain its ever-existing 
insecurity and the rationale behind its expansionist behavior, and clarify Russia’s 
contemporary emphasis on CIS countries and overreaction to NATO enlargement. The 
post–Cold War world order has given way to the emergence of new powers around 
Russia, leaving it in an unprecedented position, in which it is surrounded by political 
entities that are highly dynamic and increasingly powerful. This brand-new geopolitical 
setting of the 21st century forces Russia to cooperate both with the West and its Asian 
neighbors, avoiding confrontation while trying to regenerate its economy and domestic 
order.  
The Russian identity crisis that reemerged after the break-up of the Soviet Union 
seems to have settled down with a sort of agreement on centrism, finding a compromise 
between its autocratic culture and democratic future, its nostalgia for the imperial past 
and the attractions of the West, and its Asian and European heritages. The religious 
revival enjoyed in Russia since Perestroika contributed to this compromise as well, 
considering it has been an essential element of its identity. The historical debate over 
Russian identity between Slavophiles and Westernizers was transformed into one among 
nationalists, Eurasianists, and Westernizers. The Russian elite, after a short pro-Western 
experience, seemingly agreed on a civic identity encompassing all the people within the 
borders of Russia and compromising the contesting views of the intelligentsia. And 
notably, it managed to devise a foreign policy in conformity with its agreed-upon identity 
reflecting centrism, a combination of the views of Eurasianists and Westernizers.  
To conclude, both geographic and geopolitical realities and an agreed-upon 
identity have led Russia to design a balanced foreign policy, which, in many respects, 
favors cooperative, non-confrontational relations with the West and its Asian neighbors, 
and praises its leading role in the former Soviet space and global affairs. 
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IV. VLADIMIR PUTIN AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Russia’s foreign policy outlook has changed considerably and become 
increasingly assertive during the presidency of Vladimir Putin and his political ally 
Dmitri Medvedev. The allegedly deterioration of the relations between Russia and the 
West also coincided with Putin’s term in the Kremlin. Many have blamed Putin for the 
growingly troubled relations between the West and Russia. Among those things that have 
brought him a sinister reputation, a status of “reviled figure,” in Western capitals and 
Western media, were the assassinations of such public figures as Andrei Kozlov, deputy 
chairman of Russia’s central Bank, and Anna Politkovskaya, a pioneering journalist 
known for her criticism to the war in Chechnya and Putin’s increasing power in Russia, 
in 2006, the Kremlin’s harsh reaction to color revolutions in former Soviet space, 
nationalization of some companies in the energy sector, gas cutoffs, overt and covert 
support to the Iranian nuclear program, suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty, opposition to Western policies regarding Kosovo, and the invasion of 
Georgia.135 What has been the role of Vladimir Putin in this changing, assertive outlook 
in the Russian foreign policy? Is he an obstacle to the improvement of relations with the 
West, particularly with NATO? In the following section, the change in Russian foreign 
policy and Vladimir Putin’s impact on this change will be analyzed. 
A. RUSSIA’S ASSERTIVE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY  
Although it was not fundamental, the change in Russia’s foreign-policy outlook 
and Moscow’s alleged assertiveness is caused by two main group of factors, internal and 
external. Quite interrelated internal factors include Russia’s economic consolidation in 
the last decade and the Russian elite’s strengthening consensus over Russian identity and 
the international role and goals of Russia. On the other hand, there are three main 
external factors influencing Russian foreign policy: first, the West’s failure to 
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accommodate Russia; second, transnational threats in the post–September 11 security 
environment, and last, a new geopolitical setting with the emergence of new political and 
economic powers around Russia. 
1. Internal Factors 
As the primary internal factor in this change, Russian economic performance in 
21st century has been substantial. In almost two decades, economic conditions in Russia 
have changed dramatically. Since 1999, the GDP has grown about 7 percent annually. 
The overall size of the economy enlarged more than six times in current dollars. From 
2000 to 2005, the annual income of Russian people grew 26 percent. Russia received 
substantial direct foreign investment during those years. The performance was basically 
because of the rise of the global energy prices in 2008; however, government made some 
effort to decrease reliance on energy exports.136  
The change in Putin’s approach to foreign-policy issues coincides with the change 
in Russia’s economic conditions. As Russian economic strength rose, its international 
political influence grew as well. This process also consolidated Putin’s domestic political 
power.137 To put it in other words Russia’s global and regional political assertiveness 
strengthened as the economy and Putin’s domestic powerbase consolidated. 
The amelioration in the economy led to the restoration of Russian national pride 
and self-confidence. Until the second term of Putin, particularly until the rise of global 
energy prices in 2008, Russia’s foreign policy remained “passive” and “reactive.”  At 
first, Putin was rather obedient to Western policies, even in the case of the integration of 
Baltic States in NATO. However, Russia’s newfound energy wealth has led to a sense of 
independence and power in Moscow and helped resurrect its leadership character. 
Therefore, the changes in Russian foreign policy outlook in the second term of Putin has 
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not much to do with his personality; rather they are the outcome of Russia’s stronger 
position in the international arena, originating mostly from the economic recovery. 138 
With the help of the economic recovery, domestic conditions in Russia also 
improved. The Russian elite and people are feeling more confident in defining the role of 
Russia. Two major political ideologies conflicted in this regard: Atlanticism and 
Eurasianism. The liberal and democratic-minded supporters of Atlanticism were 
defending the view of absolute integration with the West by adopting the ideas and 
institutions of it, while Eurasianists put emphasis on the unique identity of Russia, 
comprising both Western and Asian features. After oscillating between Atlanticism and 
Eurasianism, the political elite consensus embraced the blend of these two political 
ideologies, called centrism. The supporters of this ideology admit the superiority of and 
the need to tilt toward Western civilization, while attributing to Russia a great power role 
in international affairs, particularly in the former Soviet space. In this sense, Jeffrey 
Mankoff asserts “Foreign policy under Putin achieved a kind of balance between the 
prescriptions of the Eurasianists and the liberal Atlanticists.”139  
This consensus has provided legitimacy and political support for Vladimir Putin 
to embrace a more assertive foreign policy. The head of the Center for International 
Security and the Institute for International Economy and International Relationships of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, Alexei Arbatov, pointed out in 1994 that “There is an 
overwhelming consensus on the main goal of strategic and national security: that Russia 
should remain one of the world’s great powers.”140 The strategic design pursued by 
Vladimir Putin has been a reflection of this consensus among the Russian elite 
concerning the nature of international relations and identity of Russia as a state. Putin, 
overall, just made some small touches and refashioned a foreign policy based on the 
general strategic consensus since the mid-1990s.141 
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Actually the tide of Westernism in Russian politics started to change in the midst 
of the Yeltsin era. Even Yeltsin himself changed his pro-Western outlook toward the end 
of his term in office. Mankoff asserts, “The roots of (Russia’s) estrangement” from the 
West “stretch further back, into the Yeltsin years (or beyond).” He reminds the reader of 
the criticism against Yeltsin because of his lapse from pro-Western foreign policy and his 
anti-democratic practices after a “brief flirtation” with the West in the beginning of 
1990s.142 
In foreign-policy terms, this early change came as a reaction to two fundamental 
frustrations of Russian elites and masses. The first was Russia’s increasing subordination 
to the West and loss of national pride. Second was frustration over deteriorating domestic 
economic and social conditions, despite the hopeful rhetoric of pro-Western politicians 
regarding the virtues and benefits of democracy and a liberal economy. 
In particular, during the Andrey Kozyrev’s term as Russian foreign minister, 
between 1991 and 1996, developments disturbed the elite and public opinion. The 
perception that Kozyrev was kowtowing to the West without gaining anything in return 
sparked tremendous criticism among the elite and common people. For many, Kozyrev’s 
submissive and passive approach was humiliating and undermined the international 
image and prestige of Russia. The Russian elite, who associated their country with 
imperial glories and a global power role, rejected the foreign-policy outlook under 
Kozyrev, no matter what the prospects of pursuing such a policy.143 
Even more influential in the growth of a general reaction against the pro-Western 
approach of the Yeltsin and Kozyrev were the deteriorating social and economic 
conditions of the country during the reforms of the early 1990s. In the mind of the 
Russian electorate, democracy increasingly came to be associated with poverty and 
instability. The idea of Westernization and integration with the West gradually lost its 
appeal in the mid-1990s.144 
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2. External Factors 
In addition to internal factors, such external factors as the West’s failure to 
accommodate Russia, the changing geopolitical settings around the periphery of Russia, 
and finally the new security environment after September 11 have contributed to the 
change in Russian foreign policy outlook at the turn of century, strengthening the anti-
Western political ideologies in Russian political culture. 
The primary external factor that helped change the course of Russian foreign 
policy toward centrism and end the romance with Westernism was the West’s failure to 
accommodate Russia in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR. The West continued to 
act in the zero-sum thinking mode of the Cold War. Notably, the West’s frustrating 
response to Russia’s requests for economic aid helped change the course of Russian 
foreign policy.145  
Initially,” according to Andrei P. Tsygankov, a professor at San Francisco 
State University, “the country’s leadership was hoping to develop a grand 
strategy by engaging Western nations, in particular the United States, in 
projects of common significance, such as counterterrorism and energy 
security. However, as the West turned its attention elsewhere [Asia-
Pacific] and as Russia grew stronger, the Kremlin made important 
adjustments to its policy.146  
On the other hand, NATO as the flag-carrying institution of the West’s 
hegemony, under the leadership of the U.S., was late to respond effectively to the 
immediate needs of the post–Cold War era. It failed to carry out the necessary structural 
and doctrinal transformation, and remained between containing and integrating Russia. 
As much as did Russia’s strategic insecurity, NATO’s uncertainty about the course it  
 
 
should follow hindered the development of full-fledged cooperation between the West 
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and Russia. Over all, North Atlantic Cooperation failed to manage Russian–NATO 
relations effectively.147 
At the turn of the millennium, there existed several dynamic political entities 
around the borders of the Russian Federation. To the west, NATO and the EU continually 
enlarged their physical borders and area of influence toward Russia’s traditional sphere of 
interest. To the Southeast, China skyrocketed its economic and political power, and 
began to disseminate a political and economic sphere of interests toward Central Asia and 
the Russian Far East. Finally, India, to the south, consolidated its economic and 
technological power and rose as a candidate of the great-powers club. Thomas Graham, 
former Director of the Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council 
during George W. Bush’s presidency, points out that “For the first time since Russia 
emerged as a great European power three centuries ago, it is now surrounded beyond the 
former Soviet space by countries and regions that are more dynamic than it is, 
economically, demographically and geopolitically.”148 This dynamism has contributed to 
one of the most notable aspects of Russian identity, its deep-seated insecurity. It has 
reinforced the perception among the Russian elite that particularly pro-Western foreign 
policy is a kind of subordination to the wills of the West and NATO and severely 
undermines Russia’s future. Russia’s growing economic strength and the erosion of 
power, and accordingly, of hegemon status, of the United States, based on change in the 
unipolar character of the international system, has contributed to Russia’s self-confidence 
and encouraged Russia to act more independently. Over all, geopolitical developments at 
the turn of the millennium have led Russia to pursue a more assertive and independent 
foreign policy rather than a submissive, single-faceted, pro-Western approach. 
After September 11, Moscow has been particularly concerned about the 
destabilization stemming from the U.S. strategy of global regime change. Three factors 
have concerned decision makers in the Kremlin: First, a possible color revolution, similar 
to those in Ukraine and Georgia; second, encirclement by pro-American regimes and 
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NATO enlargement, which contributes to its sense of strategic insecurity; and finally, 
increasing radicalization of Islam, caused by the U.S.’s isolation of moderate Muslims.149 
In the aftermath of September 11, radical Islamic terrorism became the 
predominant threat to any political entity of the era. “Russia [as well,] felt vulnerable to 
[the] radicalization of Islam.”150 Concerned about developments in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa, recently Russia seem to follow a different track in responding the 
democratic awakening of the people of the Muslim world. For instance, Russia’s stance 
against a military intervention in Syria is a reflection both of its demand for respectful 
treatment as a well-regarded member of the international community and global player, 
and also of Russia’s concern for the spread of radical Islamist movements to its near-
abroad, northern Caucasus, and Central Asian states. It is also Russia’s concern that such 
a situation could lead to a Libya-like unilateral intervention by NATO in regions that 
have close proximity to its borders. Therefore, Putin asserts that the reaction of the West 
to the Russian–Chinese veto of the UNSC resolution is merely hysterical. And any 
attempt to bypass this may have dangerous consequences in the long run. It can damage 
the authority of the UN and the working of the international system.151 
B. IS PUTIN ANTI-WESTERN? 
The image of Vladimir Putin has been pretty dark for a long time in the West. His 
third term in the presidency has further strengthened concerns about the future of the 
relationship between the West and Russia. Particularly, the euphoria enjoyed during the 
presidency of Medvedev seems to have disappeared. The “reset” that started during the 
presidency of Dmitri Medvedev, under the initiative of the U.S. president Barack Obama, 
has gone on the backburner since Putin assumed the presidency of the Russian Federation 
for the third time. Medvedev’s more modern and positive image, which seemed to ease 
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tension after the dark days of the last two years of the Bush administration, was replaced 
by a new wave of concern and pessimism upon the third election of Putin.152 
Many scholars and Western foreign ministries are quite concerned about the 
implications of Putin’s absolute regaining of the reins again. The principal objective of 
this section is to analyze the presidency’s influence on foreign-policy decisions and try 
to address the question of whether Vladimir Putin really is an obstacle to a closer 
partnership between NATO and Russia.  
1. The Presidency’s Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy 
The presidency in the making of the Russian foreign policy is influential, but not 
to the extent that it was in the USSR. Mankoff asserts that the presidency holds the 
strings, particularly in the 21st century; the ministry of foreign affairs and parliament do 
not play a major role.153 And he notes that Putin’s Russia was not a monolith, despite the 
centralization of decision-making processes. To him Putin, could not establish a complete 
top-down foreign-policy mechanism. Even though he curbed the influence of the 
legislature and regional authorities, such actors as the large energy companies and 
security services kept playing important roles in the making of foreign policy. The 
greatest achievement of Putin’s centralized foreign-policy mechanism has been the 
creation of a “coherent vision of the national interest,” which can hardly be observed in 
the Yeltsin–Primakov years. Yeltsin was unsuccessful in coordinating the activities and 
foreign-policy goals of the Security Council, foreign ministry, and many bureaucratic 
actors. 154 
As compared with Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin assigns greater importance to 
foreign policy and wants to be more influential in the designing of it, since he thinks that 
domestic and foreign policies are interrelated and complementary to each other. He took 
many of these powers with him when he assumed the position of prime minister.155 
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“While it makes sense to speak of a Kozyrev foreign policy or a Primakov foreign policy, 
the same does not hold for a Lavrov foreign policy . . .”156 In short, Putin’s direct impact 
on foreign policy is substantial, however, he has tried to act within the lines of the general 
consensus over the identity of the Russia and foreign-policy outlook and his decisions 
have reflected the popular and intellectual demands. Donaldson and Nogee points out 
“Russian foreign policy emerges from the interaction of decision makers representing a 
variety of personal and institutional perspectives and involved in the simultaneous 
resolution of a large number of domestic and foreign issues.”157 
2. The Putin Administration   
It is hard to define Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy approach as anti-Western. It is 
assertive, it is more independent, it has grandiose aspirations, but it is quite pragmatic and 
multi-faceted. It is the product of complex and interrelated processes, social and political 
necessities. To put it another way, Putin’s approach to the West has been shaped by many 
factors, especially by the needs of Russia’s international position. But, one thing 
unchanging in Putin’s foreign policy views is his commitment to the restoration of Russia 
as a great power.158  And many of the policies that have created the perception that 
Russian foreign policy has become anti-Western under Putin’s leadership have been a 
result of this commitment. In fact, during his presidency, no fundamental change 
occurred in the foreign-policy orientation of Russia. As Donaldson and Nogee point out 
“Vladimir Putin pursued a pragmatic, cautious, and nuanced foreign policy that revealed 
no clear-cut orientations. It revealed a mix of Atlanticist and Eurasianist (‘pragmatic 
nationalist’) perspectives.”159 He has not committed Russia to a single approach in its 
relations to the outside world; it has become European in its affairs with Europe, it has 
been a “transcontinental strategic partner” in relations with the U.S., Asian and Eurasian 
in Asia, and watchfully “integrationist” in the CIS.160 
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Although it is widely claimed to be rhetorical, Putin, on several occasions, has 
emphasized Russia’s belonging to the Western civilization and its European identity, 
while many times he also mentioned Russia as a Eurasian power. This actually reflects 
the inner dilemmas of Russia regarding its identity and belonging. Eurasia, as a term, is 
well embraced by only two nations, Turkey and Russia, who share similarities in their 
dilemmas of belongingness and identity between the West and East. It is not wrong to 
argue in this regard that this is the manifestation of both Putin’s awareness of the Asian 
roots of Russian culture and his aspirations towards achieving the civilizational level of 
the West. It also demonstrates his pragmatic way in foreign policy.   
The Putin administrations’ priority and focus in foreign policy is enhancing the 
influence and power of Russia in the former Soviet space and the international arena 
without harming productive working relations with the West. In economic terms 
particularly, Putin has pursued integration with the West by ignoring the Eurasianists’ 
call for a regional focus within the CIS. In this sense, Putin personally insisted on 
supporting the war of the U.S. against terrorism in cooperation with NATO, despite the 
opposite views of his advisors.161 Putin’s biggest concern has been, in fact, to be treated 
as an equal partner, to be accepted with its unique identity. 162 These terms were tacitly 
accepted by the Obama administration. Speaking in Munich in February 2009, Vice 
President Joseph Biden announced a “reset” of U.S. policy toward Russia. This has 
ushered in a period of constructive and productive relations between the two countries. 
It is valuable at this point to take a look at “sovereign democracy” (suverenneaya 
demokratiya), Moscow’s unofficial ideology, and its originator, Vladislav Surkov. 
Surkov is the godfather of the notion of sovereign democracy. He has held onto his 
position in government since the first term of Putin and occupied the deputy prime 
minister position since 2011. He is one of the grey cardinals—behind the scenes actors—
of the Putin administration. Even though the sovereign-democracy concept is ambiguous 
and controversial, it basically emphasizes the ultimate independence of Russia, 
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particularly from the West. To this idea, Russia has to maintain its sovereign role and 
uniqueness in the international arena and reject any foreign influence that could 
destabilize its position. Even the father of the thought, Surkov is not against integration 
with the West, and does not consider himself an Eurasianist unless it does not turn out to 
be subordination. Unlike Eurasianists thinkers such as Alexander Dugin, who sees 
sovereignty in foreign policy as a means of balancing the West, Surkov promotes 
sovereignty as a way of having freedom of choice in foreign policy. For him, sovereignty 
is just for enabling Moscow room for maneuver in international affairs and freedom of 
action that will allow it to move along its own interests, independent of the influence of 
international organizations.163 
On the other hand, Russia’s foreign policy remained fundamentally the same 
during Putin’s terms. The wind of change that dragged Russian foreign policy away from 
the pro-Western axis dates back to the era of Yevgeny Primakov, the successor of 
Kozyrev. Mankoff asserts that foundations of most of the foreign policies pursued by 
Putin was laid in Primakov’s term as foreign minister, though Primakov and Putin were 
political rivals for the presidential nomination in 2000.164 
Yevgeny Primakov, served as the foreign minister under Yeltsin between 1996 
and 1998, pursuing a balanced foreign policy tilted toward restoration of Russia as a 
leading power. He was not anti-Western, yet rejected a subservient relationship to the 
West. He put emphasis on the image of Russia as a great power and the need to design a 
foreign policy centering on this core idea. Primakov promoted four foreign-policy tasks:  
first, “creating external conditions conducive to strengthening the country’s territorial 
integrity;” second, “strengthening processes of reintegration, especially in the economy, 
in the former USSR;” third, “settling regional and interethnic conflicts in the CIS and 
former Yugoslavia,” and last, preventing the creation of new areas of tension and 
proliferation of WMDs.165 Remembering the priorities of Russian foreign policy today 
articulated in what some have termed as “the Medvedev doctrine,” there are many 
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similarities among the foreign policy outlooks of those periods. Thus it is fair to argue 
that many tendencies in Russian foreign policy attributed to Vladimir Putin actually 
represent continuity since the mid-1990s. 166 Such notions as the creation of a multipolar 
world ruled by international law and Russia’s interests in the former Soviet states have 
existed in Russian foreign-policy documents for two decades.167 
3. Putin’s Third Term  
Putin’s return to office generated deep concern in the Western capitals and media 
regarding the democratic future of Russia and its future ties with the West. Many claimed 
that this would bring an end to the reset in U.S.-Russia relations, wishing that Medvedev 
had stayed in office. However, it should be remembered that Medvedev was able to 
pursue the reset only with Putin’s full, tacit approval.168  Thomas Graham asserts,  
Even had Medvedev stayed on as President, the road ahead would have 
been rocky. But Putin’s return exacerbates the situation, for he symbolizes 
the stark differences in values, interests and outlook that still divide Russia 
and the United States and feed the dark images of Russia that, rightly or 
wrongly, pervade the American political establishment. 169   
For sure there are many rightful concerns about the democratic future of Russia, 
considering the domestic non-democratic practices, bad management of elections, 
including allegations of ballot stuffing, and using state funds for the interests of the 
United Russia Party. It is not easy to argue that Russia’s democratic future is 
bright, at least in the short run; however, considering Russia is still a middle-
income developing country, its democratic and liberal economic performance is 
quite different from those countries in the same category. To Andrei Shleifer and 
Daniel Treisman, the Western media and politicians have mostly tended to view and 
describe Russia as a collapsed and evil state inhabited by criminals and threatening other 
countries with multiple contagions rather than as a middle-income country struggling to 
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overcome its Communist past and deep-rooted Communist legacy and find its place in 
the international system.170 All democracies in this range have troubles such as 
corruption, a politicized judiciary, censorship of the press, and income inequality. In this 
respect, Russia is a normal country.171 It cannot be argued that Russia is in the way of 
being a capitalist, liberal-democratic country, but it is obvious that it is neither in the way 
of becoming a dictatorship. Vladimir Putin himself is not the reason of the problems 
facing Russia today; they stem from structural and deep-rooted factors. 
It is highly likely that “A new Putin presidency will undoubtedly occasionally 
contain harsh rhetoric and recriminations against the West, aimed in part at impressing a 
domestic audience.”172 Yet, this is not to say that Putin fundamentally and categorically 
against the West. 
Establishment of civilian control over the military in the last decade and, recently, 
establishment of a new relatively liberal and less corrupt cabinet, along with Russia’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), are positive developments for the 
democratic future of Russia and support the argument that Putin is not anti-Western. 
This new liberality has surprised everyone dealing with Russian politics.  
The old cabinet was stacked with ministers considered highly corrupt, 
including former KGB officers and Putin cronies from his days in the St. 
Petersburg city government. With a couple of exceptions, they are all 
gone. Despite some suggestions that the new cabinet represents Putin’s 
attempt to solidify his control over the new government, the group is in 
fact, dominated by liberal technocrats.173 
Putin’s ousting of corrupt politicians and his former KGB cronies can assist 
Russian progress toward liberal democracy. On the other hand, just as with China a 
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decade ago, WTO membership should press Russia to compete more openly and fairly in 
world markets and to abide more closely by international trade rules.174  
To conclude, the Putin administration is not responsible for Russia’s assertive 
foreign policy in the 21st century. The change and increasing assertiveness not only 
started before Putin’s rise to the office, it is also the product of some internal and external 
factors. While Russia’s economic consolidation in the last decade, along with the Russian 
elite’s strengthening consensus over Russian identity and the international role and goals 
of Russia, constitute internal factors, external factors are the West’s failure to 
accommodate Russia, transnational threats of the post–September 11 security 
environment, and a new geopolitical setting with the emergence of new political and 
economic powers around Russia. Putin himself has never been anti-Western during his 
presidency. He is well aware of the need for the modernization of Russia’s political and 
economic systems and appreciates the achievements in Westernization since Peter the 
Great. Considering the popular and elite demand for Russia’s great power status and 
prestigious position in international affairs, his assertive and sometimes harsh rhetoric 
against the Western powers make sense. 
Putin’s years in the presidency also coincide with the emergence of dynamic 
actors around the periphery of Russia. While China, India, and Southeast Asian countries 
experienced substantial economic and political consolidation, NATO and the EU 
enlarged their borders toward Russia’s immediate neighborhood. The combination of 
enhanced strategic insecurity and increasing economic and political power has led the 
Putin administration to develop a more independent and assertive foreign policy, placing 
priorities first on restoring the international prestige of Russia and then on rebuilding its 
influence on former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Therefore, it is 
wrong to argue that Putin’s policies were either absolutely pro- or purely anti-Western.175 
Putin has sought to maintain ties and partnerships with the West while trying to avoid a 
subservient position.  
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V. COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND THE NATO-RUSSIA 
RELATIONS 
Scholars mostly agree on three main factors inhibiting mutual positive approaches 
and limiting the improvement of cooperation at a certain level. They are the distinction 
between Russian and Western identity, the Russian political culture’s authoritarian 
tendencies, and the legacy of old hatreds, namely deep-seated reciprocal distrust. As 
observed chapters III and IV, these obstacles can be surmounted. Despite the abundance 
of obstacles, both sides have been aware of their common interests and challenges. After 
the Cold War, and particularly September 11, 2001, new security challenges created a 
common ground and helped bridge the gap between the two major actors in global 
politics. Throughout this process, the cooperative security concept contributed a lot to the 
amelioration of relations and overcoming of well-known impediments. Beginning with 
the 1970s, the realist perspective of old enemies has been gradually replaced by the 
constructive approaches of parties. This change will be analyzed by discussing why and 
how the cooperative-security concept has fostered relations, and how the relations 
evolved within the framework of this concept, with the help of its institutions.  
In short, this chapter seeks to explore the prospects of a strategic partnership and 
closer relations liberated from the shadow of distrust. After conceptually analyzing the 
cooperative-security concept and its benefits, as a framework for NATO–Russian 
relations, it will provide a review of the implementation of the concept—its birth and 
development—in a historical perspective, focusing on the late Cold War, post–Cold War, 
and post–September 11 eras. 
A. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND 
COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
The mutual misperceptions about the intentions of policy and strategy fuel 
mistrust on each side of the old east west divide in the past two decades. This fact is 
accordingly the major source of conflict and sometimes ‘undesirable competition’ in 
international relations. Cooperation in this sense is invaluable, since it helps persuade 
parties that some actions are fueled by their reciprocal insecurity, not by “greed” and 
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helps reduce the possibility of conflict. Lionel Ponsard asserts that misperceptions and 
mutual suspicion in an anarchic system can damage security and stability, no matter how 
much peaceful intentions the participants of the system have. He suggests a “legal and 
diplomatic means to keep eye on each other” as the only way to alleviate the security 
dilemma and prevent undesired competition.176 There are two dimensions to this: first, 
keeping eye on each other within organizations and institutions, and second between 
states or organizations, through cooperative arrangements or bilateral cooperative 
interactions. Three cooperative concepts, in this sense, have shaped NATO as a security 
organization and in its relations with other entities.         
Concepts of collective defense, collective security, and cooperative security are 
all concepts in which states choose to cooperate in various degrees of interdependency 
and partnership for their own interest. They are also the interrelated and complementary 
conceptual pillars of NATO on which its structure and policies are built. Despite being 
blurred, there are stark differences between what they mean and what their definitions 
are. Before examining how and why cooperative security provides the most suitable 
context for the NATO-Russia relations, their differences should be understood. 
Collective-security and -defense concepts are the creations of 20th-century efforts 
to configure a system of stability and peace with roots in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
They aim to overcome the negative consequences of the anarchic character of the 
international system and counterweighting and deterring an over-strengthened enemy. 
“Both concepts imply a long–term, formal commitment between groups of states to 
protect the security interests of individual members within their common spheres.”177 
Collective security aims to restore and maintain peace via multilateral commitments and 
arrangements to limit, deter, or destroy an aggression by the joint action of the all 
member states. The strongest supporter of this concept was President Woodrow Wilson, 
It favors collective reaction against a potential aggressor and a collective protection 
guarantee for the potential victim of an aggression, to encourage participation and deter 
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aggressors. In this regard, it is an inward-looking concept, as it aims to achieve security 
within the states. A group of states pledges to defend each other in case of an attack or 
aggression within the group, the first example of which in history is the League of 
Nations.178 Lionel Ponsard claims that, by building confidence and promoting 
cooperation, collective security systems reduce the possibility of security dilemmas, 
promote stability, and help establish a middle course between global governance and 
international anarchy.179  
In contrast to collective security, collective defense systems, a product of the 
Second World War and Cold War, are outward looking and based on the pledge of a 
group of states to defend each other from external “predetermined” threats and 
enemies.180 “It implies a determinate structure for a determinate purpose, and requires, 
although not always named, a determinate foe.”181  
Because an alliance, or collective defense pact, is an instrument of states 
cooperating to seek security from external threats posed by others, one of 
its chief preoccupations is achieving a favorable, or at least acceptable, 
balance of power as a means of deterring war or hedging against its 
outbreak.182  
This can clearly be observed in the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5: “The Parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all . . . “183 In its 1991 strategic concept, also it is 
clearly identified that “the security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack to one is an attack 
to all.”184 
The cooperative-security concept, on the other hand, has become popular since 
the beginning of the 1990s. In a modern sense, its roots go back to the 1970s, to the Cold 
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War between the United States and Soviet Union.185 “It has been generally used to 
describe a more peaceful, but rather idealistic, approach to security through increased 
international harmony and cooperation.”186 Cooperative security is based on the 
assumption that uncertainty about each other’s intentions generates insecurity among 
states. Thus, it aims to regulate interstate attitudes via common norms, rules, and 
standards that might otherwise cause misperceptions and misleading interpretations. 
While collective security and defense systems seek to deter and defeat threats and require 
preparations for such, cooperative-security systems seek to prevent threats before they 
originate. 187 In this sense, Cohen asserts, “it appeared to offer an escape from narrow 
Cold War “zero-sum” strategies in to the broad sunlit vistas of international peace and 
harmony.”188 
Accordingly, Richard Cohen’s model for cooperative security, “Cooperative 
Security: The Four Rings,” based on the notion of widening concentric rings, may help 
explain the discrepancies in the three security concepts. To him,  
“Cooperative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus 
of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or 
informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and 
practical and transparent economic, political, and defense cooperation. In a 
Cooperative Security system, individual states’ national security 
objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security: Ring One: 
Individual Security (Promoting and protecting human rights within their 
own boundaries and further afield), Ring Two: Collective Security 
(Maintaining peace and stability within their common space), Ring Three: 
Collective Defense (Mutual protection against outside aggression, Ring 
Four: Promoting Stability (Actively promoting stability in other areas 
where conflict could threaten their shared security, using political, 
informational,economic, and, if necessary, military means).”189 
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Overall, as Janne E. Nolan asserts, cooperative security is like a preventive 
medicine, while collective security and collective defense are like an acute cure, and they 
are complementary to each other.190 The cooperative-security concept has caught on 
since the end of the Cold War because it has been considered the best way to address the 
changing needs of global security. This new security environment requires more 
cooperation, transparency, and collaboration to achieve and maintain stability and peace.  
B. COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND NATO- RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Neorealist theory underlines the role of configuration of the international system 
in relations between states and suggests that interstate relations will be transformed when 
a change occurs in the configuration. Humanity witnessed this change in late 20th century 
when the Berlin Wall fell. It “compelled both NATO and Russia to review their approach 
to one another, the former willing to avoid the re-emergence of the enemy, and the latter 
wishing not to be isolated from the new international order.” 191 From this time on, the 
cooperative-security concept has provided many opportunities to both NATO and its 
adversary Russia.  
For an era of cooperation and promoting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic 
region, transparency and dialogue are the cure, if not the panacea, whereas uncertainty 
about the intentions of the adversary, mutual distrust, and cultural differences cause 
escalation of mutual political anger and constitute the primary obstacles to cooperation. 
NATO, the most prominent political and security organization of the last half century, 
has achieved a relatively soft transition from the unstable, bipolar, and realist-minded 
security environment of the Cold War to a more stable, peace-promoting one by focusing 
on cures. Particularly in Europe, it has aimed to enlarge its sphere of influence as a peace, 
democracy, and stability promoter, to the disadvantage of Russia, while trying to avoid 
offending it. In this regard, its cooperative initiatives since the end of 1960s, particularly 
after the 1990s, have paid off quite well. Contrary to early USSR–NATO relations 
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between 1949 and 1990, a new period of Russian–NATO relations has been marked by 
cooperation and dialogue, despite many failures and pitfalls. Holger Mölder points out,  
NATO with the new Strategic Concept approved in the Rome Summit 
[1991], entered into a new era often called the post-modern society. The 
creation of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO’s first cooperative 
security arrangement, was the beginning of NATO’s new cooperation-
oriented security strategy, known as partnership192  
Mölder offers four models in the post-modern security environment of Europe: 
security communities, cooperative security arrangements, collective security 
arrangements, and security complexes.193 He asserts that cooperative security 
arrangements are the most effective models for security communities seeking stability 
and avoiding the emergence of security dilemmas in their neighborhood, because they do 
not require values sharing and the bonds of treaties while possessing similar guarantees 
for their defense as members of security communities.194 Ponsard also claims that the 
concept of cooperative security does not require commitment from participants beyond a 
certain level of assurances. It does not require “high institutional mechanisms” such as a 
membership, or compliance to supranational policies; rather it necessitates close 
cooperation and preventive action in case of threats to international peace and security.195  
Mölder thinks that “Cooperative security arrangements that promote 
interdependence and cooperation have proved themselves as effective measures in order  
to  establish  zones  of  peace,  mitigate  the  possibility  for  conflicts  and avoid the 
emergence of adversaries.” 196 Three main characteristics identified by Molder 
demonstrate how cooperative security arrangements provide optimum avenues for the  
relationship between NATO and Russia: first, they are problem-solving oriented, not 
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defense oriented against an aggressor; second, they prioritize common beliefs over 
common norms, and common norms over common identity; third, they emerge around 
the security communities. Ultimately, cooperative security arrangements offer NATO “a 
tailored solution” between maintaining stability and rapid enlargement.197 
Besides theoretical explanations, historical evidence has also indicated that a 
cooperative security approach renders the creation of a stable and peace-promoting space 
in Central and Eastern Europe possible, without leading to major confrontation between 
the former adversaries. The seeds of a cooperative approach between NATO and Russia 
were cultivated back in the late 1960s and 1970s. This process, which began with the 
Harmel Report and culminated in the establishment of the NATO-Russia council, can be 
identified in three periods: the late Cold War era, post–Cold War era, and post–
September 11. During the subsequent four decades in the relationship between Russia 
and NATO, transparency, cooperation and dialogue have increased, while mutual 
distrust, antagonism, and differences have decreased.  
C. THE LATE COLD WAR ERA 
The quest for dialogue and cooperation to promote peace and stability in Europe 
dates back to the Harmel Report. Before the Cold War came to an end, “the NATO 
members had already been working hard to improve security relations in Europe, largely 
through negotiating arms control and confidence-building measures with the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.”198 In late 1960s, the NATO–Russia relations entered a 
new era called détente. As dialogue intensified between East and West, Western officials 
began to promote the idea of the establishment of a lasting peace in Euro-Atlantic region 
via NATO. The “Harmel Report on Future Tasks of Alliance” stressed and accordingly 
acknowledging the necessity for détente. 199 “Harmel Report reasserted NATO’s basic 
principles and effectively introduced the notion of deterrence and dialogue, setting the 
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scene for NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues that 
would emerge in 1991.”200 As Stanley Sloan points out,  
…particularly after NATO adopted the Harmel Report in 1967, NATO 
governments actively sought to promote dialogue and cooperation with the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The goal was to try to overcome 
the East-West division in Europe and prevent the war for which NATO 
nonetheless continued to prepare.201 
 The Harmel Report requested two functions for NATO: first political and the 
second military.202 “It also introduced a new dimension, committing the Alliance to a 
dual-track policy: it advocated the need to seek a relaxation of East-West relations while 
maintaining adequate defense . . .”203 Yost asserts that “during the Cold War, the 
Alliance’s long-term political objective was rarely expressed more precisely than in the 
Harmel Report:204 “The ultimate political purpose of the alliance is to achieve a just and 
lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.”205In 
effect, Harmel Report led to initial cooperative arrangements during the Cold War such 
as the establishment of CSCE in 1972, talks on mutual and balanced force reductions  
(MBFR) in 1973, and political ground for intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in 
1985.206  
The Helsinki final act signed in 1975 “provided the ‘rules for the road’ for 
interstate relations in Europe and constructive guidelines for the development of 
democracy in all European countries.”207 NATO’s initiative of détente, the Helsinki 
Process, resulted in settlement of human rights groups in Eastern Europe that undermined 
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the institutions of Communism and achievement of deals on nuclear and conventional 
force-reduction treaties in the late 1980s. Sloan for instance points out that “the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty of November 19, 1990,” a product of 
this process, “is the most comprehensive, legally binding agreement on conventional 
arms control ever produced . . . Since the treaty entered into force on November 9, 1992, 
some 60,000 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, attack helicopters, 
and combat aircraft have been removed from the area and destroyed.”208 All these, 
attempts, from MBFR, INF to CFE, rendered the military forces of the parties more 
visible and transparent, and moved them closer to each other.   
Eventually, NATO’s détente, deterrence, and defense policies contributed to the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in a relatively 
stable and peaceful way.209 In sum, it can be argued that the fruits of the process, which 
began with Harmel Report, the CSCE, MBFR, INF, and the CFE, constituted the 
preliminary constructive steps for an intensified cooperation and partnership era after the 
Cold War and contributed significantly to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability by promoting 
trust, dialogue, and transparency.   
D. THE POST–COLD WAR ERA 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era of major shifts in the 
Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The predictable status quo of the Cold War was 
replaced by uncertainty and imbalances in international relations. This new era also 
created many opportunities for political entities to exist together more peacefully.  
The former enemies, Russia and NATO, found themselves in a different security 
environment accordingly. NATO had long been aspiring to design a space of stability and 
peace that would enhance democracy and the rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe, 
from which Soviet influence receded for good a decade before the turn of the millennium. 
NATO paid particular attention not to offend the former enemy while doing this. Primary 
inheritor of Soviet Union, Russia, was on the other hand trying to democratize and align 
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itself with the West. It was aspiring to be an equal participant in the new security 
architecture and did not want to be isolated in Asian steps. As always since Peter the 
Great, Russia’s sanguine feelings about the West suffered from the duality of admiration 
and hate. It unwillingly admitted the superiority of the West and refrained from 
alienation. In sum, both NATO and Russia were quite unwilling to see the reemergence 
of a sort of confrontation that troubled almost a half-century of both of them. 
“At Rome,” in November 1990, “the Allies loosened the Harmel formula, which 
had established NATO’s dual approach of dialogue and defense, by adding the task of 
cooperation and partnership with former adversaries.”210  They praised the contributions 
of the CSCE to peace and stability of Europe and reiterated their determination to create 
“a new age of confidence, stability, and peace.”211 The North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) in this regard was the first initiative, via which NATO’s relations with 
former adversaries took place until May 1997. NATO took this first formal step 
immediately after the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, in November 1991. 212  Rome’s 
declaration was inviting former Warsaw pact members to join in “a more structured 
relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.”213 NACC 
was not able to fulfill its mission; however, it provided a formal basis for dialogue in the 
immediate wake of the fifty-year-old confrontation. 
Above all, the NACC was an initiative to prevent the re-emergence of the Cold 
War division; nonetheless, the limits of it were apparent and well known from its 
inception. It should be noted that even the step itself was meaningful, considering it was 
the first concrete arrangement in the beginning of a new era. It provided a formal venue 
for dialogue, and a rallying point for further cooperative steps. Molder notes “NATO, 
with the new Strategic Concept approved in the Rome Summit, entered into the new era 
often called the post-modern society. The creation of the NACC, NATO’s first 
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cooperative security arrangement, was the beginning of NATO’s new cooperation-
oriented security strategy, known as partnership. “214 To Ian R. Thomas “… it allowed 
NATO as an institution to open bilateral contacts without extending the binding 
commitment of a security guarantee.”215 It eventually was composed of twenty-two 
former adversaries in addition to sixteen NATO countries, and served as a forum bringing 
all NATO members and partners together until Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) replaced it in May 1997.216 
The Partnership for Peace (PFP), approved in Brussels in January 1994, was 
another cooperative arrangement that would serve towards the peaceful transformation of 
Euro-Atlantic security. “The partnership was built on the NACC format and designed to 
help the alliance and its prospective new members move from the symbols of partnership 
to the substantive mutual obligations of membership.”217 It has been “a sort of training 
program for NATO membership” according to a senior U.S. official, as Thomas cited.218 
It has created a venue for countries willing to join NATO to interact with and share 
knowledge, experience, and expertise. According to Mölder “PfP projects and exercises, 
and PfP gives non-NATO members access to NATO’s military and political bodies, 
offering a degree of consultation that goes far beyond the dialogue offered by the 
NACC.”219 
“The PfP has had the required flexibility to cope with an uncertain strategic 
environment without ‘leaving the Russia in the cold,” Ponsard asserts.220 It has been a 
creative solution to keep Russia oriented towards West, without giving too much 
                                                
214 Mölder, Cooperative Security and Baltic Sea, 18. 
215 Thomas,  The Promise of Alliance, 156. 
216 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 100. 
217 Thomas,  The Promise of Alliance, 157. 
218 Ibid., 157. 
219 Alex J. Bellamy, 2004. Security Communities and their Neighbors. Regional Fortresses or Global 
Integrators? Palgrave MacMillan, 82, cited in Mölder, Cooperative Security and Baltic Sea. 
220 Ponsard, Bridging the Gap, 67. 
 80 
authority.221 It was exactly what NATO officials had been seeking for to outreach 
former Soviet states, and very valuable for three aspects: First, it gained time; second, no 
future commitment was made, and third, it did not undermine relations with Russia.222    
Because PfP has been widely viewed as a preliminary step for membership to 
NATO, Russians have seen it as an infringement on their security interest and sphere of 
influence. They have not entirely rejected it in order to maintain ties with the West. 
Russia, therefore, has chosen to be an “exceptionally passive participant” of the PfP, if 
civil-emergency planning programs do not count.223 Even though PfP has not been as 
fruitful in NATO’s relations with Russia as in its relations with other partners, Molder 
claims that it is “NATO’s best-known and most developed cooperative security 
initiative.”224 From the Russian point of view, it is still a “limited and technical program” 
that will fail to serve as a basis for the relations between NATO and Russia, no matter 
how much it has been a useful venue for enhancing military cooperation and reciprocal 
confidence.225 Overall, PfP has been an arrangement through which partners promote 
their security cooperatively, rather than being simply a “waiting room;” and it has 
provided a communicative framework for constructing common interpretations of 
norms.226  
It became clear in the mid-1990s that in addition to others, NATO needed to 
develop a separate and a special relationship with Russia, which would serve as a basis 
for improvement of cooperation and development of a lasting partnership. Russia, as 
well, was willing take such a structural step for improved cooperation. According to 
Martin A. Smith, two reasons lay behind the requests of Moscow for this special 
relationship: First it would be viewed as the recognition of Russia’s great-power status; 
second, it would constitute a structural way to participate in the decision-making process 
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that would prevent an action not desired by Kremlin.227 In this regard, the Founding Act, 
signed in Paris in May 1997 after long negotiations, did meet the first expectation of 
Moscow, but not the second one. Moscow had to settle for some consultative rights.   
The Founding Act was the culmination of the constructive efforts for an enhanced 
the NATO–Russian cooperation and partnership since the Harmel Report. It introduced 
the Permanent Joint Council, the first special institution for bilateral the NATO–Russia 
relations only.   
It marked the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between 
NATO and Russia . . . The central objective of the Permanent Joint 
Council [would] be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and 
habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia.228  
From the beginning of the negotiations, contrary to Moscow’s aim to achieve a 
venue that would enable it to participate in NATO’s decision-making process, NATO’s 
determination to ensure that PJC remained a forum for consultation and cooperation 
caused tension and delayed a compromise on the framework.229 Eventually, it was clearly 
stated in the act that “provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, 
with a right of veto over the actions of the other.”230 Allies denied a greater say of Russia 
over NATO’s actions and decisions. According to Smith “this ensured that Russia could 
not exploit potential divisions among NATO’s members.”231  Even though the PJC did 
not meet the demands of Russia, it served as a framework and mechanism for 
consultation and cooperation “to develop common approaches to European security and 
to political problems.”232 
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Before the first enlargement wave, according to some circles, NATO’s move was 
practically aiming to overcome Russian opposition and any deterioration in relations with 
a “cooperative embrace,” and it was sensible.233 Peter Trenin-Straussov asserts that 
Russian leadership, aware of this and cognizant that they could not stall the enlargement 
process, sought to gain security assurances from NATO that would “minimize the 
material impact” of the process on Russia’s security.234 In line with this fact, the Allies 
had to reassure Moscow by reiterating that “they have no intention, no plan, and no 
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to 
change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any 
future need to do so.”235 
Over all, the Founding Act created the PJC, a distinct venue for the bilateral 
NATO–Russian relations, granting Russia a unique status, but depriving it of a real say in 
NATO’s internal decision mechanisms. It reassured NATO by reassuring the three-no’s 
regarding deployment of nuclear weapons on the eve of the enlargement process.  
Despite the early optimism of both sides, PJC failed to serve effectively as a basis 
for NATO–Russia relations. Upon NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 
without a UN mandate, Kremlin suspended its participation in the PJC, accusing NATO 
of violating the terms of the founding act.236 Many commented that PJC failed in its first 
serious test. However, some, such as Trenin-Straussov, asserted that it had been already 
apparent that PJC would fail, because “pre-agreed-on positions” of NATO members and 
their unwillingness to discuss “main political issues” in depth had turned the PJC already 
into a “talking shop.”237  It was true that it had many defects, but it was an important and 
effective step in terms of its service as a private dialogue venue for NATO and Russia. 
The Kosovo Crisis, accordingly, revealed that “serious challenges to Europe’s security 
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would likely require significant de facto cooperation, if not full de jure partnership, in 
order to be tackled effectively besides it led to the suspension of PJC.”238 The NATO–
Russia relations did not stall entirely after the Kosovo Crisis and returned to normal after 
some four months, since both sides were aware of the necessity of cooperation in the new 
security environment after the Cold War. However, according to Dmitri Trenin, Russia-
NATO relations did not fully recover after Kosovo Crisis;239 it would wait until Putin’s 
ascendance to power in Russia. 
E. POST–SEPTEMBER 11 ERA 
Major developments in the NATO–Russia relations came after September 11, 
2001. Terrorist attacks on U.S. targets revolutionized security concepts and doctrines all 
around the world, and introduced a new era of cooperation. As an immediate response, 
two days after the attacks, at PJC’s extraordinary meeting, parties pledged to work 
together and called the entire international community to unite in the struggle against 
terrorism. During further discussions and meetings in the same year on finding ways to 
combat terrorism, NATO and Russia decided to forge a new relationship that would serve 
better for cooperation and working together. Putin’s cooperative approach and Tony 
Blair’s encouraging initiative, and later Secretary General Robertson’s efforts indicated 
the consensus over the need for a new cooperative framework. A NATO–Russia joint 
statement issued on 7 December 2001 at PJC meeting at the level of foreign ministers in 
Brussels reflected that will: 
Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship between NATO 
Allies and Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of 
common interest and to stand up to new threats and risks to our security. 
We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the 
Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared 
commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in 
the NATO–Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new impetus and 
substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating a new council 
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bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue 
opportunities for joint action at 20.240 
Discussions continued about the details of the arrangement in the first half of the 
following year. In a conference in February 2002, Secretary General Robertson stated 
“this conference is another step towards turning a tragedy into an opportunity: A strong 
relationship befitting NATO and Russia, and benefiting the entire Euro-Atlantic 
community.”241 Eventually on 28 May 2002 the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) was 
introduced amid great optimism. The NRC replaced the PJC. 
Even though the new council introduced some changes, the overall architecture in 
fact remained unchanged. According to Lord Robertson, the real difference was 
“chemistry rather than arithmetic, as even the best format and seating arrangements can 
be no substitute for genuine political will and open minds on both sides.”242 The NRC 
would operate on the basis of consensus; decisions would be taken on the basis of 
equality. This meant that Russia received a co-decision-making right in a council of 
twenty.243 All the nineteen areas for cooperation in the founding act remained valid in the 
context of the NRC. Meetings would be held more regular basis. A preparatory 
committee was established to prevent “pre-cooked NATO positions” and “19 against 1” 
situation, which invalidated the NRC for years.  
Ponsard asserts “except for the principle of consensus, actually the essential 
feature of the NRC differing from the PJC’s 19+1 format, the NATO Secretary General’s 
chairmanship, and the Preparatory Committee, the functioning of respectively the NRC 
and the PJC is quite identical.”244  Since the novelties are about main troublers 
                                                
240  “NATO–Russia Joint Statement,” issued on the Occasion of the Meeting of the Permanent Joint 
Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 7 December 2001,” Press Statement, 7 December 
2001, Accessed in June 2012, . 
241  Lord Robertson, Secretary General NATO, “NATO–Russia Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: 
A Good Idea Whose Time Has Come,” Key note address at the NATO–Russia Conference on the Military 
Role in Combating Terrorism, 4 February 2002, NATO Defense College, Rome.  
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020204a.htm.  
242 Lord Robertson, “NATO in the 21st Century,” Speech at Charles University, Prague, 
March21,2002, cited in  Sloan, Permanent Alliance , 133.  
243 Smith, Will The Future Resemble The Past, 109. 
244 Ponsard, Bridging the Gap, 83. 
 85 
circumscribing the effectiveness of the PJC, the future of the NRC seems brighter than 
the PJC, in spite of its limitations. The NRC does not grant a veto right that Russians 
passionately desired, but gives them an equal voice in decisions ranging from 
counterterrorism to maritime safety. It also provides NATO members a safeguard 
mechanism by which they could veto any discussion.245 Overall, the NRC can be 
considered a balanced and viable solution and a rational venue for increasing partnership 
and compromise. 
Neither the first nor the second huge wave of enlargement gave rise to a 
confrontation beyond a certain level. However, the missile-defense issue ignited Russian 
anger. The U.S. decision in 2007 to deploy missile interceptors in Poland and a radar 
facility in the Czech Republic was the cause of this antagonism. To Stanley Sloan, 
Russian reaction consists of multiple components. He argues that Russian leadership has 
been well aware that this planned system does not limit or undermine Moscow’s 
intercontinental ballistic capabilities, and even their viability has not been proven. 
However, the reason behind their characterization of these systems as a threat inhabits 
domestic political concerns. The Putin leadership largely devised this argument to 
consolidate and justify their increasingly authoritarian rule by defining it as a landmark of 
U.S. influence and power at their front gate. Moscow argued that new NATO missile-
defense systems could serve for the purpose of future NATO expansion by threatening 
Russian missile capabilities.246    
The NRC’s record is not perfect so far, but considering the distance covered since 
the Harmel Report in 1967, it is satisfactory. In two respects, Martin Smith argues, NRCs 
record has been relatively impressive: first, unlike the PJC and former efforts, NRC has 
many institutionalized mechanisms such as a preparatory committee, enabling more equal 
participation to decision-making and planning processes; second, the scope of activities 
developed under its auspices is very wide.247  It seems successful that the NRC was not 
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affected by the Iraq crisis in 2003, during which NATO and Russia embraced opposing 
policies.248 In this regard, former Secretary General Robertson asserts that  
… the existence of the NRC has prevented differences over Iraq from 
becoming a crisis, like the NATO- Russia Relationship suffered during the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999. It has brought about a new maturity. It has created 
a new equality and a new respect for each other, so that we are now 
capable of disagreeing without falling out . . .249  
In 2004, during and in the immediate aftermath of the most extensive enlargement 
wave of NATO, no big deterioration occurred in the NATO–Russia relations. Despite a 
relatively minor reaction of Moscow, the NRC managed to reconcile Russian reactions. 
However, NRC has failed in resolving four major issues inherited from the PJC: 
Kosovo’s status, the future of CFE treaty, missile defense, and NATO enlargement.250   
Overall, the NRC, as the ultimate cooperative security arrangement between 
former adversaries, is supposed to be considered the latest upgrade of the NATO–Russia 
relations. Its achievements are more important than its failures in the sense that it is a 
constructive establishment and its framework for addressing issues is limited and subject 
to NAC’s approval. It is ultimately not a mechanism for problem solving, but rather a 
forum where all issues can be discussed. Its essential responsibilities were to promote 
dialogue, mutual understanding, transparency, and practical cooperation, and eliminate 
distrust and uncertainties.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the Cold War “the allies faced the challenging task of keeping their 
commitment to enlarge while avoiding a new confrontational relationship with 
Moscow.”251  Cooperative security arrangements have offered NATO “a tailored 
solution” between maintaining stability in Europe and rapid enlargement in this 
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regard.252 If we exclude the crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Georgia, no high-level 
confrontation has unfolded between NATO and Russia on a scale of the Cold War. Even 
though NATO has continued to enlarge its borders and sphere of influence, Russia’s 
reactions mostly remain within the framework of conventional diplomacy and there has 
been no resort to arms, save in the Caucasus—itself a miracle. The cooperative security 
concept and its products since the Harmel Report, and especially since 1990, have 
contributed to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, prevented a military 
escalation, and reconciled opposing views by promoting venues dialogue and 
interdependence. Considering NATO’s main concern has been creating a stable and 
peace-promoting Europe by enlarging its borders and sphere of influence without 
provoking old enmities with Russia, cooperative-security arrangements have worked 
well. After all, despite dire predictions by skeptics of the enlargement and transformation 
of NATO, a fundamental enmity of the most dangerous kind, as in former times, failed to 
appear.   
They served the interest of not only NATO, but also Russia, whose expectations 
have been to participate in Western security institutions as an equal partner, inhibit 
decisions that would not be welcomed by the Moscow, and avoid being isolated to Asian 
steps. The track record of cooperative security arrangements indicates that Russia 
increasingly gained a greater say in these arrangements, if not a veto power. The 
arrangements have increasingly become more institutionalized and transparent. 
Today the threats to European security are more complicated and transnational.  
They include corruption, organized crime, migration, epidemic diseases, 
environmental catastrophes, and terrorism. For all these reasons, 
cooperative procedures for enhancing international accountability can be 
considered the most promising responses to the challenges facing states 
under the anarchic international system.253  
Despite many failures and criticism, promoting cooperative security arrangements 
is the best policy for all parties, since the challenges of the new security environment 
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necessitate more cooperation, transparency, and dialogue. It can be observed that slow 
and gradual ameliorations created sound partnerships. The more dialogue, cooperation, 
and interdependence have increased in the NATO–Russia relations, the more the distrust, 
bias and antagonism have decreased. Over all, a cooperative approach in the NATO–
Russia relations has the potential of creating more opportunities and overcoming 




For better or worse, the NATO–Russia relations continue to be one of the main 
pillars of global security architecture in the post–Cold War era, particularly in the Euro-
Atlantic region. Stability and peace in Europe and beyond depend on how well the old 
enemies NATO and Russia design their approaches to each other and construct their 
relationship on the basis of trust and interdependence. However, the attempts of both 
sides have remained under a certain level of cooperation, notwithstanding the continual 
efforts of parties since the Harmel Report in 1967 and the common ground that the new 
security environment of post–September 11 has prepared for a closer partnership.  
“With the end of the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has 
continued to struggle to define its identity and clarify its raison d’etre.”254 It sought to 
create a stable space along the entire Euro-Atlantic region that would be suitable for 
democracy, rule of law, freedoms, human rights, and liberal economy to flourish. It 
aimed thus to build partnerships and integrate former Warsaw Pact countries, while 
trying to avoid a serious confrontation with Russia. Russia, on the other hand, has sought 
to overcome its economic and sociopolitical imbalances under the influence of nostalgia 
for the past and promoting its assertiveness in both its traditional sphere of influence and 
the global stage. In this sense, it considered the enlargement of NATO a threat to its 
grandiose interests and national security. Moscow’s concerns about NATO’s goals and 
strategies have driven it to adopt a reactive attitude from time to time. Relations between 
the two entities fluctuated between excessive optimism and over-pessimism on the 
common denominator of distrust. They are wedged between the promise of stronger 
partnership in an era of unpredictability and transnational threats and lingering memories 
of old antagonism and distrust.  
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the security 
environment and threats to security of countries, alliances, and the entire world have 
changed dramatically. Technological and geopolitical changes revolutionized threat 
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perceptions and means of reassuring security. The relatively stagnant and predictable 
nature of the Cold War was replaced by unprecedented uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Regional ethnic/religious conflicts all around the world, the emergence of transnational 
terrorist organizations, religious radicalization, the shift in global economic balances, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and nuclear weapons, and the 
rising demand for energy and water supplies all pose great risks to global security and 
peace. This new era of unpredictability and uncertainty has established a common ground 
for the old enemies Russia and NATO and is gradually bringing them together. 
Recently, declarations after the 2012 Chicago Summit, 2010 Lisbon Summits, and 
recent annual NRC reports and final statements reveal the increasing awareness for the 
necessity of closer partnership and cooperation, and increasing will in accordance. For 
instance the final draft of the 2010 Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon 
Summit, formally interprets the desire of the NATO countries to improve constructive 
relations with Russia and move towards a full-fledged strategic partnership. The recent 
statements of political leaders and high-level officials from Moscow are in line with these 
summit reports and declarations. In sum, all strategic concepts, summit declarations, and 
statements of leaders and top-level officials underline the significance of improvement of 
the NATO–Russia relations. 
NATO’s constructive efforts toward security and a resolution of the underlying 
causes of tension in Europe date back to Harmel Report in 1967, long before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Since then, NATO has sought to normalize its relations with its 
adversary, limit the escalation of enmity, and end the division of East and West. The 
Helsinki Act in 1975, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1990, Partnership 
for Peace in 1994, Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council in 1997, and finally the 
NATO–Russia Council in 2002 are the landmarks of the cooperative efforts of NATO 
before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
Russia, on its part, has always been aware of its dilemmas; between economic and 
structural problems and its grandiose goals, it has sought to align itself gradually with the 
West in order not to be isolated and to take part in founding the new security systems of 
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post–Cold War and post–September 11. Its responses to NATO’s constructive steps, 
therefore, have been mostly affirmative, if not always.  
The major trouble in the post–Cold War era in the NATO–Russian relations, in 
the view of Moscow, has been the enlargement of NATO. Enlargement of NATO’s 
borders and influence has been read in Moscow as expansion of U.S. influence and 
strength, filling the vacuum left by the Soviet Union. NATO’s extension to Russia’s 
immediate borders naturally has caused concern in Moscow, while paying little heed to 
the security concern of central and eastern Europeans.255  However, the amelioration of 
relations has observed an increasing trend, especially since the advent of the Putin regime 
in the year 1999, even though it has been slow and gradual and full of frustrations and 
failures. 
There have been several factors leading to ebb and flow in the NATO–Russia 
relationship. While the traditional insecurity and realist perspectives of Russian leaders 
and cultural distinction of Russia from the West hinder the advancement of relations 
beyond a certain level, contemporary geopolitical realities and Russia’s long-standing 
Westernization approaches compel Russia to move closer to the West. Overall, Russia 
has had to design a balanced foreign policy, which in many respects, favors cooperative, 
non-confrontational relations with the West and its Asian neighbors, and at the same 
time, praises its leading role in the former Soviet space and global affairs. 
Consequently, Russian foreign policy is the product of the combination of 
historical, cultural, religious, and geopolitical factors with the rational choices of the 
Russian elite and people. Along with the legacies of the tsarist and Soviet eras, existing 
ideological currents among the elites and common people regarding what Russian 
identity is and how the foreign policy of the Moscow should look effects the foreign 
policy priorities and designs of the Putin administration.   
Russia’s foreign policy outlook seemingly changed considerably and become 
increasingly assertive during the presidencies of Putin and Medvedev. The alleged 
deterioration of the relations between Russia and the West also has coincided with 
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Putin’s term in the Kremlin. Many have blamed Putin for the growingly troubled 
relations between the West and Russia. However, contrary to allegations, Putin’s 
administration has not been responsible for Russia’s assertive foreign policy in the 21st 
century. The change and increasing assertiveness not only started before Putin’s rise to 
office, but are also a product of independent internal and external factors. Moreover, 
Putin himself has never been anti-Western during his presidency. He is well aware of the 
need for the modernization of Russia’s political and economic systems, and appreciates 
the achievements in Westernization since Peter the Great. Considering the popular and 
elite demand for Russia’s great-power status and prestigious position in international 
affairs, it would be nonsense for a political leader to completely ignore such electoral 
demands. His assertive and sometimes harsh rhetoric against the Western powers makes 
totally sense and should not lead to conclusions that Putin is anti-Western. Putin basically 
has sought to maintain its ties and partnerships with the West while trying to avoid 
ending up subservient in his relations with the West.  
This thesis ultimately aims to answer the question of whether a common ground 
could be constructed between NATO and Russia by analyzing all impeding factors, 
shared interests, and common challenges that could serve as an inhibitor or catalyst in 
promoting a strategic partnership. It argues affirmatively that it is possible for Russia and 
NATO to make a clean sweep of the lingering legacies of deep-seated antagonism and 
distrust, move beyond cultural, religious, and historical differences between them, and 
lay the foundations of a healthy, lasting partnership. As Lionel Ponsard argues, “There is 
still a long way to go before these relations will be fully normalized. However, this past 
decade of oscillating relations is very instructive in many respects.”256 Common interests 
and challenges and changing geopolitical dynamics facilitate, and even makes vital, this 
rapprochement. 
Overall, despite many risks and obstacles, the improvement of relations and 
achievement of a stronger cooperation and true strategic partnership is still possible and 
important in the NATO–Russia relations, and requires only positive approaches from two 
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entities. There are many opportunities for rebuilding trust and strengthening relations, as 
well as many impediments. The parties need to concentrate on opportunities and 
commonalities rather than over-focusing on obstacles and differences, if they are to 
promote peace and stability in Europe. In this regard, small steps can have a cumulative 
effect, and the parties should not expect sudden changes and ameliorations. It is 
particularly important that NATO acknowledge that Russia evolves differently and 
remain patient during Russia’s political evolvement toward democracy. It also has to be 
ready to recognize a greater say for Russia in its security designs for frictionless, 
sustainable relations, and a stable and peace-promoting Europe. Cooperative security 
arrangements offer NATO and Russia a tailored solution between maintaining stability in 
Europe and their foreign-policy outlooks and improve their partnership and cooperation, 
gradually. Particularly, the NATO–Russian Council (NRC) looks promising and can 
continue to serve as a forum for dialogue, which is crucial for the elimination of bias, 
distrust, and misperception.  
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